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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

AN EXPLORATION OF ORGANIZATIONAL BUYING BEHAVIOR IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR
This dissertation begins with a comprehensive examination of the current state of research
regarding organizational buying behavior. Through this review we identify a significant
gap in our existing knowledge regarding organizational buying behavior in the public
sector. Due to the high level of impact that government purchasing has on the economy,
and the nuances that differentiate public from private sector purchasing practices, I further
explore organizational buying behavior in the public sector to make the following
contributions.
First, I highlight the common practice in business-to-government (B2G) and business-tobusiness (B2B) transactions where buyers limit suppliers’ access to them during the buying
process. This research terms these buyers “barricaded buyers.” Despite their prominence
in practice, research related to barricaded buyers remains virtually non-existent. Therefore,
the present research draws on insights gleaned from eight case studies over a period of
approximately eighteen months to shed light on this important topic.
Second, this dissertation advances a conceptual framework highlighting competitive
actions a focal supplier can take to improve its selection likelihood when selling to
barricaded buyers. The framework identifies novel ways suppliers can gain advantage by
reducing competitive intensity in the pre-barricade phase (e.g., by peacocking) and by
enhancing their RFP response quality in the post-barricade phase (e.g., by offering
consummate solutions). Importantly, the framework invokes the notion of strategic
information disclosure whereby a focal supplier may gain advantage by knowing when to
convey what types of information in barricaded buying environments.

Keywords: organizational buying behavior, sales, business-to-government, B2G, RFP, barricaded
buyers
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1. Introduction

In 2010, B2B (business-to-business) transactions accounted for over $10 trillion in the
United States (Grewal et al. 2015). Despite the financial magnitude, less than five articles
per year have been devoted to B2B in the top four marketing journals in the last decade
(Lilien 2016). One area of B2B research in much need of attention is organizational buying
behavior (OBB). “Many of the foundational models [of OBB], which were developed
decades ago, are static in nature and centered on the North American or European
institutional structure. However, there are forces from evolving technologies and
globalization that are dramatically affecting the nature of B2B buying and challenging the
validity of these models and their underlying assumptions” (Lilien 2016, p. 5). Due to the
high level of practical and theoretical impact, it is not surprising that OBB research is
presently one of the top research priorities of the Institute for the Study of Business Markets
and the Marketing Science Institute (Institute for the Study of Business Markets 2018;
Marketing Science Institute 2018). In particular, ISBM asks, “To what extent is extant
knowledge on buying centers and buyer behaviors still valid?” To this end, it is important
for marketing academics to both reexamine existing OBB models, as well as fill in
knowledge gaps that still remain (Grewal et al. 2015; Lilien 2016).

The purpose of this dissertation is to review existing literature on organizational buying
behavior in order to highlight research gaps that have significant implications for marketers
in the present buying and selling environment. Through this review it is apparent that there
is presently a significant gap in knowledge regarding organizational buying behavior in the
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public sector. This gap is surprising considering the significant financial impact that public
sector purchases have on the United States’ and world economy (Lilien 2016). Following
the review of existing OBB literature, this dissertation uses a grounded-theory approach
using case study methodology to develop a conceptual framework of organizational buying
behavior in the public sector. In doing so I also explore the role of competition among
suppliers competing for a buyer’s business in order to shed light on how suppliers can
compete more effectively when selling to public sector organizations.

2

2. Organizational Buying Behavior Research: A Review and Future Directions

Much of the existing research on OBB and buying centers is based on models developed
in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (e.g., Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Sheth 1973;
Webster and Wind 1972). “Organizational buying behavior includes all activities of
organizational members as they define a buying situation and identify, evaluate, and choose
among alternative brands and suppliers” (Webster and Wind 1972, p. 14). The buying
center “refers to all those members of an organization who become involved in the buying
process for a particular product or service” (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a, p. 143). Whereas
organizational buying behavior is a system of processes, the buying center is the group of
individuals representing a customer firm at the center of these processes. In order to
understand organizational buying behavior it is imperative to understand buying center
composition, and how this composition affects the processes that result in the selection of
a final supplier. In this section, I discuss and integrate the foundational models of OBB and
the subsequent research that followed in order to develop a general model of the present
state of knowledge regarding organizational buyers and the organizational buying process.

2.1

Seminal Models of Organizational Buying

The foundational models of organizational buying behavior in marketing were developed
by Webster and Wind (1972) and Sheth (1973). While these models were developed
separately, both contain many similar constructs, likely due to the fact that each model
builds on similar literature from the late 1960’s (e.g., Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967).
3

For example, both models include the effects of environmental, organizational, task, group,
and individual variables on organizational buying. The variables form the foundation for
much of the subsequent organizational buying literature spanning 45 years. As such, it is
important to understand the similarities and differences of these models that have been
instrumental in shaping organizational buying literature.

The Webster and Wind model (1972) differs from the Sheth model (1973) in that the former
focuses in greater detail on the context of the buying task that affects buying center
composition while the latter focuses more on group processes. For example, Webster and
Wind highlight how factors such as product availability and the buying firm’s competitive
environment affect characteristics of the purchase, and in turn individuals will be recruited
for involvement in the purchase (such as managers or engineers), resulting in the buying
center’s final composition of members. Buying center composition refers to the final
demographics of the buying center such as experience of members, education, and total
size of the buying center (Webster and Wind 1972). With such a large number of variables
that can potentially impact buying center composition, the Webster and Wind model
implies that each buying center is likely a unique composition of members that differs both
within and between buying organizations (Johnston and Lewin 1996).

The Sheth (1973) model differs from the Webster and Wind model in two key respects.
First, the Sheth model focuses less on the context of the buying task, and more on how
group processes account for organizational buying outcomes. For example, group decision
making processes can have positive or negative impact on the final decision depending on
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the type of conflict resolution tactics used (e.g., problem-solving and persuasion being
positive, and bargaining and politicking being negative). Conflict resolution is noted as
important to OBB due to the inevitability of diverging interests between team members.
Second, the Sheth model focuses more on information search and use in the organizational
buying process than do Webster and Wind (1972). The Sheth model describes key
differences in what information buying center members may have in the beginning of the
process, how they may choose to actively collect information going forward, and how
members may choose to use this information during the buying process. Sheth notes an
important factor in the joint decision-making process is “assimilation of information,
deliberations on it, and the consequent which most joint-decisions entail” (p. 54).

Based on the variables of interest within extant organizational buying literature, it is useful
to organize variables into three categories; inputs, processes, and outcomes (see Figure
2.1). In the general model presented here, inputs refer to situational characteristics that
determine what product will be purchased and who will be involved in the purchase.
Processes refer to the behaviors and actions of buying center members that lead to purchase
outcomes. Finally, purchase outcomes refer to the impact of these processes on the buyer
and supplier organizations. In the two foundational models of organizational buying,
environmental, organizational, task, group, and individual characteristics are examples of
inputs, while information search, influence, participation, and conflict management are
examples of processes. Outcomes in organizational purchasing include purchase choice or
buying team member satisfaction in the outcome. These foundational models have served
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as a significant foundation from which organizational buying literature has been built over
the last 45 years.

In order to develop my review, I focused on research conducted from these seminal papers
onward. In order to identify articles, I used EBSCOhost Business Source Complete to
search Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of the Academy of
Marketing Science, Journal of Business Research, International Journal of Marketing
Research, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal of Personal Selling and Sales
Management, Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing, Journal of Business and
Industrial Marketing for the terms “organizational buying,” “business buying,”
“organizational purchasing,” and “organizational buying.” Next articles were eliminated
on the basis of whether or not they focused directly on the organizational buying process.
For example, a majority of articles focused on buyer-seller relationships and not the
organizational buying process itself. Based on this process, 219 articles were reviewed for
this paper. In the next sections, an input, process, and outcome framework is used to
organize and review extant organizational buying literature that builds on these
foundational models.

2.2

Defining the Organizational Buying Process

Organizational buying was originally defined as a “decision-making process carried out by
individuals, in interaction with other people, in the context of a formal organization”
(Webster and Wind 1972, p. 13). More recently organizational buying has been defined as
6

“four ongoing processes: implementation, evaluation, reassessment, and confirmation”
(Grewal et al. 2015, p. 195). In the latter definition, implementation includes activities that
are “undertaken to acquire and receive goods and services directly, within the parameters
of the current buying decision” (Grewal et al. 2015, p. 195). As such, the newer definition
includes traditional organizational buying in stage one, that is, the buyer engages in
discussion with many suppliers about a potential purchase. While stages two through four
focus on the exchange process between a specific supplier, or suppliers, and the buying
organization. This distinction is important because in the latter stages an official
relationship is established between buyer and supplier that is difficult to terminate (Heide
and Weiss 1995).

Based on this distinction I think it is important to define organizational buying from a more
traditional perspective. I define organizational buying as the active search for a product or
service supplier through a formal or informal process (Sheth 1973). This process begins
when a buyer identifies a need and concludes when a supplier, or suppliers, is selected to
provide a solution to meet that need. Once the selection occurs, the buying process
transitions to the organizational exchange process, which is the “activity between two or
more organizations that has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their
respective goals or objectives” (Achrol, Reve, and Stern 1983, p. 58). Active search is a
key component of the current definition of organizational buying. Firms often gather
information on a passive basis with no intention of actually using that information to take
action (Doney and Armstrong 1996). Buyers often acquire information on suppliers or
solutions through various sources such as trade shows (Gopalakrishna and Lilien 1995) or
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internet searches (Steward, Narus, and Roehm 2017). However, buyers may not initiate the
buying process as a result of this new information, but instead hold onto it until much later
when the buying process is initiated for some other reason.

In contrast, active search leads members within the buying organization to actively seek
out new product or service solutions. Since Robinson, Faris, and Wind (1967),
organizational buying models have ranged from four stages (Grewal et al. 2015; Sheth
1973) to eight stages (Johnston and Lewin 1996; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967). Based
on my review I propose a four-stage model of organizational buying: Need Recognition,
Specification Development, Proposal Request, and Proposal Evaluation. These stages were
identified by reviewing existing literature proposing various stages in the buying process
(e.g., Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984; Webster and Wind 1972)
then combining stages based on buyers’ expected outcomes at each stage in the process.

The Need Recognition stage occurs when the buying organization identifies a discrepancy
between the organization’s current performance and potential performance (Webster and
Wind 1972). In this stage representatives of the buying organization determine whether it
is feasible to achieve better performance through buying products or services from an
outside supplier. Buyers may examine the resources needed to develop a solution within
the organization, choose to contract with someone outside the organization, or some
combination (Heide 2003). Interestingly, there is evidence that buyers may initiate the
process for other reasons than a perceived discrepancy in current state. For example, buyers
may go through the buying process in order to gain market information and increase
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organizational learning (Dawes, Lee, and Midgely 2007). In public purchasing it is
common for the federal government to go through the buying process on a regular schedule
such as every three or five years (General Services Administration 2005). Regardless of
the reason, the outcome of the Need Recognition stage is to determine if there may be value
in going through the buying process. If so, the purchase moves into the Specification
Development phase.

The outcome of the Specification Development stage is for buyers to determine the
requirements necessary for a solution to the identified need. It is at this point that the buying
center begins to develop. The buying center is composed of all individuals that are involved
in the buying process (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). When developing specifications,
buying firms often include more individuals than at other points in the buying process
(Lilien and Wong 1984; Tanner 1998). This occurs as the buying organization often solicits
feedback from individuals within the buying organization who will be affected by the
purchase (Leigh and Rethans 1984; Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside
1984). In addition to sources from within the buying organization, specification
development occurs by gathering information from many external sources ranging from
the internet (Kennedy and Deeter-Schmelz 2001) to direct communication with salespeople
(Lilien and Wong 1984). Once buyers have reached confidence in the developed
specifications, the buying process moves to the Proposal Request stage.

The purpose of the Proposal Request stage is to solicit suppliers for a response to the
buyer’s specifications. Requesting supplier proposals consists of acquiring written or
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verbal communications from suppliers about how closely they can provide a solution that
addresses buyer specifications (Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984).
The request from buyers can come in the form of a formal request for proposal (RFP) or
request for quote (RFQ), or a request for a presentation from suppliers (Johnson, Friend,
and Malshe 2016; Verville and Halington 2003). The Proposal Request stage often starts
with a list of pre-identified suppliers that may have been involved in previous purchases or
through information gathering in the Specification Development phase (Verville and
Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984). At this point buyers may pre-screen suppliers
and determine, based on current knowledge, whether new suppliers need to be added or
deleted from this list (Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984). Buyers and
suppliers may also communicate during this phase to clarify any questions that arise from
ambiguity of supplier specifications. Once clarification is finished, suppliers submit their
responses for buyer evaluation, at which point the Proposal Evaluation stage begins.

The purpose of the Proposal Evaluation stage is to determine whether or not to select a
supplier, and if so, which supplier(s) to select. If a supplier or multiple suppliers are chosen,
buyers also engage in the negotiation process to reach a final contract offering (Verville
and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984). The evaluation process is an intensive
process where buyers compare supplier proposals against buyer specifications and to other
supplier responses (Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980; Verville and Halington 2003;
Vyas and Woodside 1984). The evaluation occurs through both individual and group
decision making processes, where buyers form individual perceptions and reach a final
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selection through group discussion (Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980; Wilson, Lilien,
and Wilson 1991; Vyas and Woodside 1984).

It is important to note that recent research has identified that the buying process is much
more dynamic than is often depicted in existing marketing literature (Bunn 1993). There is
some recent evidence that buyers move forward and backwards through the buying stages
(Makkonen, Olkkonen, and Halinen 2012; Verville and Halington 2003). For example,
information gathered when evaluating supplier proposals may cause buyers to rethink
specifications (Verville and Halington 2003). In addition, many of the organizational
buying variables that have been examined in previous research are significantly affected
by the stage of the buying process. As such, it is important to examine organizational
buying variables in relation to the stage of the buying process. In the next section, I
integrate these buying stages with variables organized around an input, process, and
outcome framework (Ilgen et al. 2005, see figure 2.1) in order to develop research
propositions and highlight areas for future research.

2.3

Inputs to the Organizational Buying Process

I define inputs to the organizational buying process as the contextual factors that affect the
buying process. Inputs can be separated into several high level categories including the
environmental, organizational, individual, and buying task that affect how the organization
defines its needs (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). In turn,
the inputs affect the processes through which a decision is made (Crow, Olshavsky and
11

Summer 1980; Hunter, Bunn, and Perrault 2006; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). The
processes are actions that buyers take in order to reach the decision, which include
information gathering, interpersonal influence, conflict resolution, and decision making.
The outcomes of the buying process have been predominately focused on supplier
selection, but also include, supplier preferences, length of decision making process, and
choice satisfaction. In the next sections, I discuss existing inputs, processes, and outputs in
the existing organizational buying behavior literature.

2.3.1

Environmental Inputs

Environment is defined as the geographic, ecological, technological, economic, political,
legal, and cultural factors that affect the information, opportunities, and constraints of the
buying task (Webster and Wind 1972). Empirical research has shown several links between
environmental inputs and buying center composition to support Webster and Wind’s
(1972) original propositions. Environmental inputs commonly examined in existing OBB
literature include number of suppliers (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Homburg and Kuester
2001; Kauffman and Leszczyc 2005; Vyas and Woodside 1984), environmental
uncertainty (Alejandro et al. 2010; McCabe 1987; Spekman and Stern 1979), relational
norms (Heide and John 1992; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007), and technology
(Stremersch et al. 2003; Weiss and Heide 1993).

Research has shown that the organizational buying process is materially affected by the
number of suppliers in the marketplace and the resulting number of suppliers who vie for
12

the buyers business (Hunter, Bunn, and Perrault 2006; Vyas and Woodside 1984). It
appears that buyers often prefer to evaluate three to four suppliers during the decision
making process (Vyas and Woodside 1984). As the number of suppliers involved in the
purchasing process grows larger, the result is greater time and effort required by buyers to
evaluate suppliers (Vyas and Woodside 1984). As a result, they often use a process of
conjunctive elimination whereby suppliers with the lowest scores on the most important
attributes are eliminated one by one until a manageable set of suppliers (e.g., four) is left
for more detailed evaluation (Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980). However, recent
research has shown that buyers may benefit in some purchasing situations by increasing
the number of suppliers in the consideration set as high as ten (Kauffman and Leszczyc
2005). In situations where price is a significant portion of the consideration, having a higher
number of suppliers increases price competition among suppliers.

Environmental uncertainty is generally measured as the amount of information available
in the marketplace to make a good decision (McCabe 1987; Spekman and Stern 1979).
Environmental uncertainty has been linked to an increase in number of individuals
involved in the purchase decision, as well as decentralization of decision making authority
(McCabe 1987; Spekman and Stern 1979; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). As
environmental uncertainty increases, organizations often include a greater number of
individuals in the purchase decision (McCabe 1987; Lewin and Donthu 2005), the amount
of information that buyers access during buying process (Alejandro et al. 2010), and the
number of suppliers considered for purchase (Kauffman and Leszczyc 2005; Kull, Oke,
and Dooley 2014).
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Another environmental input that has been shown to affect the buying process is relational
norms (Heide and John 1992). “Relational norms are expectations about behavior that are
at least partially shared by a group of decision makers” (Heide and John 1992, p. 34).
Research has shown that relational norms are related to the way in which buyers approach
relationships with salespeople (Palmatier et al. 2008), and determine the buying center
members’ mindset when beginning the buying process (Leigh and Rethans 1984). Leigh
and Rethans (1984) provide evidence that organizational buyers have knowledge and
expectations about how the purchasing process will play out based on their previous
experiences during the buying process. These expectations affect how the buyer prepares
for the buying task through information search and approach to decision making (Qualls
and Puto 1989).

Technology has long played a significant impact on organizational buying as it often
determines the information available to buyers (Grewal et al. 2015; Lilien and Wong 1984),
facilitates communication between buyers and suppliers (Agnihotri, Rapp, and Trainor
2009; Presutti 2003), and can affect the urgency of which solutions are evaluated
(Stremersch et al. 2003; Weiss and Heide 1993). As a result of technological advancement,
buyer access to information is increasing while costs for acquiring the information is
decreasing (Grewal et al. 2015). However, technological complexity of customer solutions
is increasing (Stremersch et al. 2003), leading to more complex interactions between
buyers and suppliers during the buying process (Grewal et al. 2015; Schmitz and Ganesan
2014).
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Overall, environmental variables play an important role on OBB as they can directly affect
the suppliers in the marketplace and the solutions available to buyers. They also appear to
impact the way in which buyers and suppliers interact during the buying process.
Interestingly, little research has examined how organizational buying and selling changes
across industries. While research has looked at the buying process in different contexts
such as industrial manufacturers purchasing raw materials (Vyas and Woodside 1984),
lithographic printing (Silk and Kalwani 1982), and software (Verville and Halington 2003),
there are still several significant areas that remain unexamined. For example, Lilien (2016)
highlights that public sector purchases account for billions of dollars annually, yet there is
virtually no research regarding public sector purchases. Public organizations have a high
level of oversight and regulations compared to their private sector counterparts (e.g.,
General Services Administration 2005), future research could benefit by examining the
differences between public and private purchases. As such, I offer the following research
question:

RQ1: How does organizational buying behavior differ in public sector organizations
from private organizations?

2.3.2

Organizational Inputs

The next inputs that materially affect the organizational buying process are those related to
the organization. Organizational inputs include organization size, the structure of the
organization, organizational goals, and technological constraints (Webster and Wind
15

1972). Early organizational buying research focused more heavily on organizational
characteristics than environmental characteristics (Johnston and Lewin 1996).

Originally, organizational buying literature hypothesized that formalization and
centralization in the buying process was related to characteristics of the purchase (e.g.,
novelty and complexity). Formalization refers to the degree to which the buying task is
governed by rules, procedures, and buyer roles are defined within the group (Dawes, Lee,
and Dowling 1998; McCabe 1987), while centralization refers to how concentrated and at
what organizational level final decision making within the buying process occurs (Barclay
1991). In contrast to previous organizational buying theories, recent research has provided
evidence that formalization is more closely related to organizational structure than
purchase characteristics (Lewin and Donthu 2005). Research has shown that as
organizations increase in size, so does the level of formalization and centralization of the
buying center (Barclay 1991; Grønhaug 1976), the number of individuals involved in the
buying center (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a), and buying center conflict (Barclay 1991).
However, it appears that as purchase uncertainty, novelty, and complexity increase, the
relationship between organization formalization and buying center formalization weakens
(Lewin and Donthu 2005).

In addition to formalization and centralization, employee reward structures have been
shown to materially affect the organizational buying process. Reward structures have the
ability to incentivize employees to participate more or less in the organizational buying
process (Anderson and Chambers 1985). For example, employees that receive direct
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benefits from the outcome of the buying process (e.g., buying a new computer system
makes their job easier) are more likely to participate than those who receive no benefits
(Anderson and Chambers 1985; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998). Rewards may also create
conflict in the buying process when rewards are different between buying center members
(Barclay 1991). This occurs as members with different incentives often disagree on the
importance of different specifications in the buying process (Barclay 1991). For example,
procurement may wish to keep costs down while engineering wants to purchase the highest
quality product. In addition to conflict in the buying center, research has also examined the
impact of rewards on supplier selection. Buyers are often risk averse when it comes to
buyer selection, however, reward structures can induce buyers to consider riskier suppliers
when incentivized to do so (Anderson and Wynstra 2010).

Overall, organizational factors highly influence the processes through which organizational
purchasing is carried out. The degree of formalization and centralization of decision
making are important influences on group level outcomes, while reward structures
influence both the level of individual participation and individual conflict within the group.
Presently, there is still lack of clarity as to how these variables operate within the different
stages of the buying process. For example, it appears that riskier decisions involve more
individuals in the buying process, but the final decision in the process is made by fewer
individuals (McCabe 1987). This may provide an explanation for previous findings that
show managers are more involved in making final decisions than product users (Lilien and
Wong 1984; Silk and Kalwani 1982).
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Present research on the impacts of organizational inputs on OBB is limited in two respects.
First, it is limited in that generally only a single member of the buying center is often used
to investigate the entire buying process. Not only that, many of the informants for existing
research come from the National Association of Purchasing Managers (e.g., Barclay 1991;
Leigh and Rethans 1984; Michaels, Day, and Joachimsthaler 1987). Future research would
benefit by including a greater number of individuals involved in the buying process in order
to create a more complete picture of individual motivations (Dawes, Lee, and Dowling
1998).

Second, centralization and formalization in the buying process is mainly examined at the
process, rather than stage level. Research has shown that specification development, an
earlier buying stage, is a less formalized process (Johnston and Bonoma 1981b) while the
later supplier evaluation stage is often a more formalized process (Vyas and Woodside
1984; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). Since centralization and formalization affect
several significant organizational buying variables, such as buyer information search
(Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998), an important contribution of future OBB research could
be to examine how variation of formalization and centralization affect the buying process
differently. For example, does having a set of procedures for developing buyer
specifications lead to better or worse proposals submitted by suppliers?. As a result, I offer
the following research questions:

RQ2: a) How do changes in centralization and formalization across different stages
in the buying process affect buyer behavior? b) How do changes in centralization
and formalization across different stages in the buying process affect suppliers?
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2.3.3

Buying Task Inputs

The next significant input variables in the general model of organizational buying are those
related to the buying task. These include buyclass (new purchase, modified rebuy, straight
rebuy), product type, purchase importance, purchase complexity, and purchase risk. Early
organizational buying research appears to have focused more heavily on these
characteristics than either organizational or environmental characteristics (Johnston and
Lewin 1996). Buyclass was one of the original variables proposed to affect buying center
composition and decision making (Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967), which resulted in
being one of the first variables to be repeatedly tested (e.g., Anderson, Chu, and Weitz
1987; Grønhaug 1976; Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 1984; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a).
New purchases are those that the buying organization has no previous history of making
(Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967). As a result, new purchases are often more complex and
riskier than purchases the organization has made previously. A straight rebuy is a purchase
of a product or service that the organization has made previously (Robinson, Faris, and
Wind 1967). For straight rebuys the buying organization does not make any changes from
what it has purchased previously, and generally has a high level of knowledge and
experience about the purchase. Straight rebuys involve relatively low effort for the
organization as there is little information needed to make the purchase decision. Often,
straight rebuys are routinized to the point where organizational buyers fill out a purchase
order on a repeated basis with no adjustment or consideration of alternative suppliers
(Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987). Modified rebuys fall between new purchase and straight
rebuys, and constitute the most typical organizational purchases (Anderson, Chu, and
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Weitz 1987). Modified rebuys are purchases that an organization has made before, but
requires some level of adjustment from the previous purchase (Jackson, Keith, and Burdick
1984). For example, an organization may have previously purchased computers, but
chooses to upgrade the functionality in the subsequent purchase. While the organization
has familiarity with computers, it is likely buyers will need to acquire some new
information as a result of changes in technology since the previous purchase.

While some research has supported the proposed relationship between buyclass and buying
center composition, and between buyclass and decision making processes (e.g., Anderson,
Chu, and Weitz 1987), other research has not supported these relationships (e.g., Johnston
and Bonoma 1981a). The explanation for mixed findings appears to be the combination of
importance, complexity, and risk of the purchase, rather than the buyclass itself. Robinson,
Faris, and Wind (1967) noted that generally new purchases are more novel, more complex,
and more important than straight rebuys. Research has generally supported the proposition
that buyclass groups these variables together fairly well (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987;
Bunn and Clopton 1993; McQuisten 1989), but not in all cases (Bunn 1993). In new
purchases, for example, the novelty and complexity is likely to be higher than that of a
straight rebuy. Research has shown that novelty, complexity, and importance can affect the
buying process independently of one another (McQuisten 1989). In fact, Bunn (1993) noted
two potential additional buyclasses from the original model: judgmental new task, and
complex modified rebuy. Judgmental new tasks are purchases where complexity and
importance are low, resulting in decreased perception of risk than for more traditional new
purchases. Complex modified rebuys include modified rebuys where complexity and
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importance are higher than expected than the average modified rebuy, resulting in greater
perceptions of risk (Bunn 1993).

There are several independent relationships associated with higher levels of complexity.
For example, increasing complexity results in a need for more information to make the
purchase (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987). As information needs increase, buyers consult
a greater number of sources in order to make sure they make the best decision (Bunn and
Clopton 1993). With newer purchases typically high in purchase complexity, the result is
a greater number of individuals involved in the buying process (McQuisten 1989).
Interestingly, the number of individuals involved at different stages in the buying process
appears to change. For example, more individuals are often included at earlier stages in the
buying process than later ones (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; Lilien and Wong 1984;
Verville and Halington 2003). What’s more, the individuals involved at each stage in the
buying process also changes (Lilien and Wong 1984; Verville and Halington 2003).
While a large number of individuals has been shown to benefit the organization through
increased knowledge, it has also be shown to serve a second purpose. Organizational
buyers often try to mitigate the risk associated with complex and important purchases by
increasing the level of lateral and vertical participation in the buying center (Johnston and
Bonoma 1981a). Vertical participation refers to the number of hierarchical levels involved
in the purchase decision within the buying organization (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a).
Lateral involvement refers to the number of departments involved in the purchase decision
within the organization (Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). Varying levels of lateral and
vertical involvement occur because buyers are motivated by potential professional gains
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and losses as a result of the buying task (Anderson and Chambers 1985). When purchasing
risk is high, buying center members may include a greater number of individuals in the
buying process in order to spread the blame of a bad decision (Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson
1991).

In summary, characteristics related to the purchase such as complexity and importance
have a strong influence on buying center composition and the organizational buying
process. Overall, increases in complexity and importance are significantly related to who
is involved in the buying process as well as their level of participation during the different
stages in the buying process. While some research on buying tasks has been conducted,
several areas remain unexplored. One major area presently unexamined is how the buying
task variables affect member participation at different points in the buying process. While
research has provided evidence that buying center members’ participation and influence
changes throughout the buying process (e.g., McQuisten 1989; Verville and Halington
2003), it is less clear as to why participation changes and what happens as a result.

Based on this review I propose a new variable to organizational buying literature termed
“buying center fluidity.” I define buying center fluidity as the degree to which buying
center decision-makers change throughout the buying process. Further research regarding
buying center fluidity should provide significant insight into group processes such as
information search, participation, and influence. In addition, examining the fluid nature of
buying centers may also provide significant insight for sales practices. Since salespeople
are valuable sources of information (Bunn and Clopton 1993; Moriarty and Spekman
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1984), salespeople might provide value for the buying firm by serving as a resource to
educate new members as they are brought into the buying process. As a result of this
discussion, I offer the following research question:

RQ3: How does buying center fluidity affect the organizational buying process?

2.3.4

Group and Individual Inputs

Individual inputs to the buying process include group and individual characteristics of the
buying center. It is important to note that the buying center group variables are the
aggregation of individual variables within the buying center (Webster and Wind 1972).
Individual variables include education, motivation to participate, risk preferences, and
position within the organization (Johnston and Lewin 1996; Sheth 1973; Webster and Wind
1972). Research in this area highlights how the background of individuals contributes to
the way the buying center ultimately functions. For example, research has shown that
individuals with a higher rank (e.g., manager vs. CEO) and greater centrality within the
organization are perceived to have a higher level of influence within the group (Ronchetto,
Hutt, and Reingen 1989). Centrality refers to the degree to which buyers are connected to
other employees within the buying organization (Ronchetto, Hutt, and Reingen 1989).
Hierarchies within the buying center often determine the types of influence strategies that
are used, as well as the level of influence participants are likely to have at different stages
in the decision making process (Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995). For example, users
of a product, such as engineers in a manufacturing plant, are often likely to initiate the
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buying task due to their specific knowledge of product specifications. However, managers
often make the final decision due to their authority over finances (Silk and Kalwani 1982).

Buying center member role perceptions within the buying center have also been shown to
have a significant relationship with buying center behavior. For example, role ambiguity
and role stress within organizational buying teams can lead to lower performance outcomes
(Michaels, Day, and Joachimsthaler 1987). Often in these situations employees are unsure
of what they need to contribute to the group, and let those they perceive to be more involved
make the decision. The causes of role ambiguity and role stress stem from uncertainty
within the buying task as buying centers that lack formalization have higher levels of role
ambiguity and stress (Barclay 1991).

Individual risk preferences have also been shown to affect decision making. For example,
individuals with low risk preference often choose suppliers with which they have higher
familiarity, regardless of if the supplier offers the best choice (Brown et al. 2012; Puto,
Patton, and King 1985). Risk preferences are significant to buying center decision making
as Webster and Wind (1972) note that it is one of two causes of individual behavior, the
second being individual goals. Buying center members are driven to participate in the
buying process by the goals they perceive they will achieve. However, goal achievement
is often compared against the perceived risk to achieve it. For example, a purchasing
manager who is compensated on cost savings and product performance, will likely weigh
the two against each other in determining to choose a supplier based on quality or price.
Overall, individual inputs affect group decision making through the impact on information,
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participation, influence, and conflict, making these variables some of the most impactful
on organizational buying behavior.

While much research has examined the individual goals and risk preferences on buying
center interactions and individual buyer behaviors, the assumption is that buyers are at least
somewhat interested in being part of the decision making process. However, some buying
center research has highlighted that buying center members are often uninterested in being
involved in the decision making process (Tanner 1998). Buyers cite the reason for
involvement occurs as they are volunteered by superiors to be involved and see
involvement as more of a nuisance than anything. What’s more, most models often ignore
the role of buying center members that are located outside the buying firm. For example,
research has shown that consultants often play a role in the buying process (Brossard 1998;
Dawes, Lee, and Midgley 2007; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a). Despite the prominence of
these buying center members, little is known as to how these individuals are chosen to be
included in the buying process. As a result, I propose the following research questions:

RQ4: a) How are employees chosen to be part of the buying process and how does
this selection affect OBB? b) How do organizations decide whether to include
buying center members outside the organization and how does it affect OBB?

2.4

Organizational Buying Processes

OBB literature typically looks at several key processes that determine organizational
buying outcomes: Information search and utilization (Grønhaug 1976; Anderson Chu and

25

Weitz 1987; Bunn 1993; Heide and Weiss 1993; Spekman and Stern 1979), individual
participation (Anderson and Chambers 1985; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; McQuisten
1989), interpersonal influence (Kohli 1989; Ronchetto, Hutt, and Reingen 1989;
Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995), and conflict management (Barclay 1991; Ryan and
Holbrook 1982). Together, these processes significantly affect decision-making within the
buying team (Johnston and Lewin 1996). In this section, I summarize each of these
processes and their relationships with decision-making outcomes.

2.4.1

Information Search

Gathering, analyzing, and utilizing information have been the common focus of existing
OBB literature since their proposed importance in original OBB models (Johnston and
Lewin 1996). These models hypothesized that information search was significantly related
to many of the input factors discussed in the previous section. Information is a key construct
within OBB models as information used by both individuals and the group determine
buying specifications (Moriarty and Spekman 1984), which individuals to involve in the
buying center (Krapfel 1985), which suppliers to consider (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Vyas
and Woodside 1984), and final selection (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Hada, Grewal, and
Lilien 2013; Webster and Wind 1972).

As mentioned in the previous section, information search is often dependent on
organization and buying task inputs (Bunn and Clopton 1993). Early research focused on
buyclass as a significant antecedent of information search behavior, providing evidence
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that information search increases as purchases move from straight rebuy to new purchases
(Grønhaug 1976; Anderson Chu and Weitz 1987; Bunn 1993; Heide and Weiss 1993;
Spekman and Stern 1979). Information search is also significantly related to product
complexity, purchase importance, perceived vendor switching costs, decision time, and
perceived product compatibility within the buying team (Heide and Weiss 1995; Hunter,
Bunn, and Perrault 2006; Moriarty and Spekman 1984; Weiss and Heide 1993). Early in
the buying process, buyers search for information to help them develop specifications and
identify suppliers that may be able to provide solutions to the identified specifications
(Vyas and Woodside 1984; Verville and Halington 2003). As the buying process
progresses, it appears that information search turns from exploratory in nature, to
confirmatory in nature. For example, in early stages buyers look for what suppliers are in
the market (Vyas and Woodside 1984) while in later stages they collect information to
confirm which supplier to select (Hada, Grewal, and Lilien 2014).

Along with search for information, the type of information source itself has been shown to
be an important variable in determining OBB (Aarikka-Stenroos and Makkonen 2014;
Hada, Grewal, and Lilien 2014). Early research in OBB broke information sources into two
main categories: personal and impersonal sources (Moriarty and Spekman 1984). Personal
sources of information are those that come from individuals such as a product expert or
salesperson, while impersonal sources of information are materials such as brochures or
product websites (Moriarty and Spekman 1984). Type of information source is important
to the organizational buying process as previous research has shown impersonal sources
are sought earlier in the buying process, with their importance to decision making varying
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by product type (Moriarty and Spekman 1984; Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 1987). In
addition, buying center members are more likely to use personal sources of information
throughout the entire buying process, and even more so when the purchase is perceived as
important (Anderson, Chu and Weitz 1987; Bunn and Clopton 1993; Grønhaug 1976;
Moriarty and Spekman 1984). In addition to situation, information source is often related
to experience. Those individuals with higher levels of experience tend to rely more on
information they already have, and are less likely to search for additional information
(Weiss and Heide 1993). However, if more experienced employees do search for
information, they may have the tendency to perceptually distort information so that it
confirms their previous point of view (Sheth 1973).

The results of present research on information search and use in organizational buying
provide a somewhat significant picture; as the level of purchase importance increases, the
level of information sought by the organization to make the purchase also increases. The
impact of acquired information can have a positive and negative effect on OBB. On the
positive side, information often gives firms a more competent and confident choice in their
selection (Krapfel 1985). The major downside to information search is an increase in the
amount of time needed to make a decision (Dholakia et al. 1993; Weiss and Heide 1993).
Interestingly, information search is noted as occurring early in the organizational buying
process and decreases as the buying process progresses (Vyas and Woodside 1984). Early
research noted that information search can be expensive and time consuming (Moriarty
and Spekman 1984), and as such, buyers may have been incentivized to collect all
necessary information in the beginning of the process.
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Recent developments in technology have lowered these barriers to information search in
terms of both cost and ease (Grewal et al. 2015). As a result, traditional models of
information search in the organizational buying process are needed (Lilien 2016). Access
to information is now much less expensive and much easier to acquire thanks to such tools
as the internet (Alejandro et al. 2010; Deeter-Schmelz and Kennedy 2004; Grewal et al.
2015). The results of this increased access to information on the organizational buying
process are likely to be numerous. For example, how and when do buying center members
acquire information? It is possible that due to technology, buying center members acquire
information at a greater frequency throughout the different stages of the buying process.
Verville and Halington (2003) provide evidence that information search at early stages
affect future information search and decision making processes, which highlight significant
need for better understanding of this process.

This dynamic process of information search behavior has implications for both interactions
among buying center members, as well as interactions between buying centers and
suppliers. For example, buyers may adapt their buyer specifications more frequently
throughout the buying process than previously. This may in turn impact the speed and
extent to which suppliers must adapt their sales approaches (Spiro and Weitz 1990). Future
research on organizational buying should examine in greater detail how and why
information search changes at different stages in the buying process in order to better
understand its impact on OBB. Based on this, I offer the following research questions:

29

RQ5: a) How do recent technological innovations affect information search at each
stage in the buying process? b) How does information search affect subsequent
stages in the buying process?

2.4.2

Individual Participation

Early research regarding participation in the organizational buying process highlighted
purchase importance and risk as two key antecedents to lateral and vertical involvement
(Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a; Lewin and Donthu 2005;
McQuisten 1989). That is, greater purchase importance and risk lead to a greater number
of departments represented in the buying center (lateral involvement), as well as a greater
number of managers from different organizational levels (vertical involvement). Once
individuals are chosen to be a part of the buying center, there are several factors that
determine when and how much they participate in the buying process.

While several studies have examined participation within specific stages of the
organizational buying process (e.g., Silk and Kalwani 1982; Lilien and Wong 1984;
Verville and Halington 2003; Vyas and Woodside 1984), the majority of research has
examined individual participation as total participation across all stages (e.g., Anderson,
Chu, and Weitz 1987; Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; Johnston and Bonoma 1981a;
Krapfel 1985; Michaels, Day, and Joachimsthaler 1987). Overall, results have shown that
higher levels of participation in the buying process occur when individuals are stakeholders
in the decision outcome (Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; Kohli 1989) or when they are
incentivized to participate through rewards (Anderson and Chambers 1985; Morris, Paul,
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and Rhatz 1987; Tanner 1996). Examples of stakeholders include individuals who will be
using the end product, or those whose budget is affected by the purchase decision.
Individuals may also be incentivized to participate due to their reward structure within the
organization (Anderson and Chambers 1985). An example of this would be a purchasing
manager who is compensated through cutting costs. In this case the purchasing manager
may become more involved in advocating a low cost provider whereas a purchasing
manager with no incentive based on the outcome may act more passively, such as taking a
project manager role within the buying center.

The result of higher levels of involvement by individuals in the buying center are increased
influence (Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998; McQuisten 1989), control of information
(Dawes, Lee, and Dowling 1998), and increased advocacy behavior towards specific
suppliers (Krapfel 1985). Interestingly, research has not examined the behaviors of
individuals in the buying center who have low incentive towards the outcome. Often, OBB
research assumes individuals are interested in achieving greater influence in the buying
process and thus are likely to participate more. However, the opposite is also likely to occur
for those individuals with not much to gain (low reward) and much to lose (high risk). A
significant gap in existing OBB literature can be filled through greater understanding of
how low participating individuals affect the buying process.

A significant gap in existing OBB research is that many studies often use “key informants”
as the information source. Key informants are often highly knowledgeable individuals who
have deep understanding of the purchase being studied (Dholakia et a. 1993; McQuisten
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1989; Weiss and Heide 1993). Since reward and motivation significantly affect buyer
behavior, existing findings may miss key insights about buyers who are engaged in the
buying process but much less motivated (e.g., Tanner 1998). Future research may better
understand the organizational buying process by gaining perspective from individuals who
participate less in the buying process. For example, it is assumed that buyers in the present
environment are more knowledgeable because they have greater access to information than
ever before (Grewal et al. 2015). However, with the growing technological and
organizational complexity (Schmitz and Ganesan 2014), there may be significant gaps in
knowledge between buyers with low and high motivation. The question, then, is how does
buyer motivation and engagement affect the organizational buying process in the present
environment? As a result, I offer the following research question:

RQ6: How do differences in individual participation between buyers affect group
decision-making?

2.4.3

Interpersonal Influence

With the integrative nature of buying decisions among group members, interpersonal
influence has been of particular interest to organizational buying behavior scholars. Early
research regarding organizational buying behavior examined which individuals were
influential during decision making within the organizational buying process (e.g., Silk and
Kalwani 1982). Influence within buying centers is often determined by those who are most
involved in the buying process (McQuisten 1989) and those with higher levels of power
(Kohli 1989; Silk and Kalwani 1982). However, not all types of power are created equal in
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their influence during the organizational buying process. Research has consistently shown
that buying center members with high levels of expert and reinforcement power carry the
most influence, while referent power, information control, and legitimate power appear to
have less of an effect (Kohli 1989; Ronchetto, Hutt, and Reingen 1989; Silk and Kalwani
1982).

Expert power refers to those individuals that are perceived by others within the group to
have a high level of knowledge prevalent to the buying task (Kohli 1989). Reinforcement
power on the other hand refers to an individual’s ability to mediate positive or negative
rewards (Kohli 1989). Research has shown that expert power appears to have the strongest
influence on members within the buying center regardless of time pressure or group
cohesiveness (Kohli 1989; Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman 1995). However, expert power
is weakened when individuals use strong influence attempts (Kohli 1989). Conversely,
reinforcement power appears to be more effective when strong influence attempts are used
by the individual, and also when groups are less cohesive (Kohli 1989). For example,
research has shown that engineers (experts) tend to be more influential when purchasing
components for manufacturing, while purchasing managers are more influential when
purchasing services (Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 1984). While far from extensive, some
research has examined how influence changes depending on stage of the purchasing
process (e.g., Silk and Kalwani 1982). Users of the product tend to be more influential
when developing purchasing specifications and purchasing managers more influential
when choosing the final supplier (Silk and Kalwani 1982; Vyas and Woodside 1984).
These differences in influence are suggested to be a result of the general stake each member
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has at that point in the process. For example, the cost of the purchase comes out of the
managers’ budget so they are more likely to be involved in final supplier selection than
specification development.

Finally, research regarding influence has examined the types of influence attempts used by
members within the buying center. Kohli (1989) noted that strong versus weak influence
attempts changes the amount of influence an individual has within the buying center,
depending on if their type of power expert or reinforcement. When experts used strong
influence attempts (e.g., repeated attempts) level of influence decreased. Conversely, when
individuals with reinforcement power used strong influence attempts, perceived influence
increased. Venkatesh, Kohli, and Zaltman (1995) followed with an examination of coercive
versus non-coercive influence attempts and the impact on influence within buying centers.
Results of their research showed again that the type of power was related to influence,
depending on the strategy employed. For example, those with expert power were more
influential when they used low coercive strategies such as making a recommendation,
while those with reinforcement power were more influential when using harder coercive
strategies such as making threats.

One area overlooked regarding influence in the organizational buying process is how
influence strategies change depending on the stage of the buying process. With research
showing differing effects of influence by power type, future research should examine how
different stages in the buying process affect influence strategies. For example, non-coercive
strategies might be used differently depending on whether the individual is trying to
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influence others to develop specifications, or select a final vendor. The type of influence
strategy used can provide interesting implications for how buying center members interact
with each other following the attempt. For example, use of coercive strategies early in the
buying process may lead to negative responses later in the process. As a result, I propose
the following research question:

RQ7: How does buying center influence change at different stages in the buying
process?

2.4.4

Conflict Management

“[C]onflict becomes a common consequence of the joint decision-making process; the
buying motives and expectations about brands and suppliers are considerably different for
the engineer, the user, and the purchasing agent, partly due to different educational
backgrounds and partly due to company policy” (Sheth 1973, p. 55). As highlighted by
Sheth, group decision making is likely to lead to conflict, and how the group handles this
conflict is a strong predictor of the outcomes the buying center is likely to achieve (Barclay
1991; Lambert, Boughton, and Banville 1986).

Within organizational buying, conflict typically arises from differing individual
preferences such as product specification importance or reward structure of buying center
members (Barclay 1991; Sheth 1973). In order to lessen negative outcomes of conflict
within the buying center, there are several options the group may choose. First, open
communication between buying center members has been shown to directly reduce conflict
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(Barclay 1991). In their research, Vyas and Woodside (1984) noted that any disagreements
between members of the buying center were settled through mutual discussion. “We have
to deal with many departments within the company. If differences arise (in choice criteria
or in dealing with the vendors), I voice my opinion. We discuss it, see each other's point of
view, and try to decide what is best for the company. We try not to get personalities
involved. I have been in purchasing for over 25 years and this approach has always worked”
(purchasing manager, Vyas and Woodside 1984, p. 34). Informants within their study noted
that it was important for purchasing members to keep an open mind and be willing to
compromise as needs constantly change throughout the buying process.

Some strategies that have been shown to reduce conflict include increasing formalization
(Barclay 1991) and greater information sharing among buying center members (Lambert,
Boughton, and Banville 1986). Greater formalization governing the decision making can
lower the amount of ambiguity experienced by group members and thus decrease the
potential for conflict (Barclay 1991). Barclay noted that formalization may act as a way for
leaders in the buying group to control other buying center members’ behavior. Information
sharing brings greater clarity to the reasons behind buyer perceptions and thus allows for
buying center members to discuss disagreements and resolve them (Lambert, Boughton,
and Banville 1986).

Interestingly, little research has examined the outcome of conflict resolution on purchase
satisfaction of individual buyers and buying centers. It is possible that using different
conflict resolution strategies may lead to a supplier selection, but it is unclear if buyers who
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compromise may fully support the selection. As a result, I propose the following research
question:

RQ8: How do buyer conflict resolution strategies affect buyer purchase
satisfaction?

2.5

Organizational Buying Outcomes

The typical outcome of the organizational buying process is final selection of a supplier or
multiple suppliers that the buying center perceives can best meet the organization’s needs.
Other outcomes of the organizational buying process include individual and group level
satisfaction with the final decision, however research in this area is somewhat limited.
Information search, influence, and conflict management are critical to reaching a final
solution across each of the stages in the decision making process (Bunn 1993; Choffray
and Lilien 1978). However, few studies have examined differences within each process
stage, likely due to the difficulty of acquiring this data (Anderson, Chu, and Weitz 1987;
Vyas and Woodside 1984). This difficulty occurs due to the fact that often buying center
members include somewhere between three and eight members, and that the process occurs
over an extended period of time, usually many months.

Much of the existing literature regarding decision making in organizational buying has
focused on modeling the overall process (e.g., Choffray and Lilien 1978; Crow, Olshavsky,
and Summers 1980; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). In the initial stage of the process,
individuals within the buying center develop a set of suppliers that may be able to provide
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a solution for the organization (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Vyas and Woodside 1984). Once
individuals determine this set of suppliers, individuals narrow the set of alternatives down
based on environmental constraints such as technology, and organizational requirements
such as budget (Choffray and Lilien 1978; Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers 1980). Once a
set of feasible alternatives is developed, individuals form their own preferences based on
personal evaluation criteria. Group preferences are then developed based on each buying
center members’ individual preferences and the interaction between buying center
members (Choffray and Lilien 1978).

Seven models of group choice have been proposed and tested in organizational buying
literature (Choffray and Lilien 1980; Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). The seven models
are weighted probability model (combination of individual preferences weighted by
influence and importance of each member), equiprobability model (all decision
participants have equal weight and decide what proportion of business to give each
supplier), voting model (choice is based on a vote by members), preference perturbation
model (choice is made of vendor that makes all members least upset), majority rule model
(supplier is chosen by accumulating a specific number of votes), unanimity model (supplier
is chosen when all buying center members agree on one supplier), and autocracy model
(choice of supplier is ultimately decided by a single member of the buying center).

Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson (1991) tested a contingency model of group choice by
examining how well each decision making model predicted choice in different buying
situations (e.g., new task vs. rebuy). Results of their analysis showed that no single decision
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making model best predicted group choice, and processes were dependent on the specific
buying task. However, results did support the notion that individual decision making (e.g.,
autocracy model) was used more often when purchase risk was low, such as in a straight
rebuy situation. Interestingly, in their study of organizational buying behavior, Vyas and
Woodside (1984) noted that none of the buying centers examined used any formal type of
decision making process. This highlights the conclusion that while present research
highlights what types of decision processes can be used to make a decision, why these
processes are chosen remains less clear (Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson 1991). Further research
is needed to examine the decision making process in its entirety to better understand why
buying centers use the decision making processes that they do (Wilson, Lilien, and Wilson
1991). As a result, I propose the following research question:

RQ9: How and why do buyers select different decision making processes?

2.6

Discussion

Based on my review it appears there are several key gaps in existing organizational buying
literature that could provide significant contributions to marketing theory and practice.
First, organizational buying literature has generally focused on organizational buying in
the private sector, largely ignoring the public sector altogether (Lilien 2016). This gap is
surprising considering both the financial magnitude of purchasing in the public sector and
the significant differences in rules governing purchasing practices in the public sector. For
example, government organizations must follow strict purchasing policies that are derived
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from state and federal laws (e.g., General Services Administration 2005), that may go
beyond policies in private practice. Another significant difference is the fact that employees
and managers are often the key stakeholders for organizational purchases in the private
sector, while citizens are also key stakeholders in public sector purchases. As noted
previously, formalization and stakeholding are key components of the organizational
buying process, so it should be expected that public versus private purchases will vary in
both their processes and outcomes. As such, a greater focus on research in the area of
organizational buying in the public sector should provide valuable insight for marketing
theory and practice.

In addition, future organizational buying research would benefit by greater examination of
the dynamic nature of the organizational buying process. Much of the existing literature
looks at variables such as formalization, participation, and information search in aggregate
rather than by stage of the buying process. Bunn (1993) noted that the organizational
buying process is much more dynamic than is often examined in existing organizational
buying research. Verville and Halington (2003) used an inductive process to examine the
buying process for ERP Process Software and provided greater evidence supporting this
proposition. For example, they highlighted that information search was an iterative process
where information gathered in one stage appeared to significantly affect actions in
subsequent stages. In addition, other research has shown that the buying process is often
embedded in many different processes within an organization (Makkonen, Olkkonen, and
Halinen 2012). However, in the review of existing literature there still appears to be limited
research examining how buyer and supplier behaviors in one stage affect subsequent
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stages. Specifically, how suppliers engage buyers at different points in the buying process
is especially limited. While several studies provided evidence that suppliers were valuable
sources of information (Alejandro et al. 2010; Bunn and Clopton 1993; Moriarty and
Spekman 1984; Verville and Halington 2003), little research has examined how being a
valued source of information helps (or hurts) suppliers during this process. Existing buying
and selling literature would benefit from greater focus on this important topic.
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2.7

Tables and Figures
Table 2-1: Review of Organizational Buying Literature

Article
Webster and
Wind 1972

DVs
OBB Process

Context
N/A

OBB Process

N/A

Grønhaug 1976 buyclass,
product/service firm,
organization size

information
search

survey of 160 organizational
buyers of an industrial
computer manufacturer

Spekman and
Stern 1979

buying center
structure

survey of 320 members of
buying groups across 20
organizations in 11 industries

Sheth 1973
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Variables
environment,
organization, group,
purchase (task), and
individual
characteristics
organization,
product, individual
characteristics; joint
decision process

environmental
uncertainty

Conclusions
Environmental, organizational,
purchase, group, and individual
characteristics should affect
decision making across the
organizational buying process.
Supplier or brand choice is
determined through an integrative
process of company, product,
individual, and joint decision
making factors.
An organization's size leads to
greater likelihood of purchasing
department, search for information
was lower for modified-rebuy than
new task purchase, product
independent firms were made
riskier decisions
Results showed that as the level of
uncertainty in the environment
increases, there is an increase in
the number of members of the
buying center in the final decision
(joint decision making)
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Crow,
Olshavsky, and
Summers 1980

number of vendors,
time pressure

request for
quotation,
purchase
decision

simulation of decision making
with 14 purchasing managers
in the industrial
manufacturing industry

Johnston and
Bonoma 1981a

organization size,
complexity,
formalization,
centralization;
purchase situation
importance,
complexity, novelty,
and product class

interviews with 241 buying
center members over 60
different purchases

Ryan and
Holbrook 1982

responsibility, time

extensivity,
lateral
involvement,
vertical
involvement,
connectedness,
purchasing
manager
centrality
conflict

Silk and
Kalwani 1982

job position, decision
stage

influence,
involvement

Jackson, Keith,
and Burdick
1984

product, buyclass,
decision type, and
member

influence

survey of 135 fleet
administrators across multiple
industries
interviews and surveys of 50
buying center members, in 25
purchases, across 12
organizations in the
commercial printing industry
survey using a role play
scenario of 254 buying center
members from 25 different
companies across multiple
industries

Authors showed that purchasing
managers used conjunctive
decision model to reach a selection
of suppliers for an RFQ (narrow
the decision set), and used a
lexicographic choice model to
choose a final supplier.
Organization formalization and
purchase importance had the
highest impact on buying center
network. Importance lead to
greater extensivity, and lateral and
vertical involvement. Org.
formalization lead to extensivity,
lateral involvement, and
connectedness.
Some sub-decisions within the
buying process result in more
conflict than others
Managers were more influential in
final decisions, users were more
influential in initiating changes.
Involvement was somewhat
accurately measured, influence
was not.
Purchasing managers were more
influential in choosing suppliers,
while engineers were more
influential when choosing parts.
Results also showed that buyclass

purchase situation

script norms

109 members of a local
purchasing managers
association

Lilien and
Wong 1984

job position, decision
stage

involvement

survey of 2151 individuals
involved in organizational
purchasing within industrial
manufacturing organizations

Moriarty and
Spekman 1984

purchase,
organization, and
individual
characteristics;
buying phase

sources of
information

survey of 663 buying center
members across five
industries (business services,
transportation,
retail/wholesale, finance, and
manufacturing)

Anderson and
Chambers
1985

individual
motivation, role
perceptions and

individual
decision

N/A
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Leigh and
Rethans 1984

didn't affect influence of
participants.
Organizational buyers have predeveloped scripts of how a buying
process is likely to be carried out.
In addition these scripts are likely
to change depending on
characteristics of the purchase
situation
Users (as classified by Webster
and Wind 1972) are involved in
earlier stages of the purchase
process involving developing
specifications, while deciders
(such as managers) were involved
more in later stages of the process
such as selecting a supplier.
Buying center members relied
more on personal sources of
information (colleagues,
salespeople) than impersonal
sources of information
(advertisements, news
publications). Salespeople were
especially important when buying
center participants were heavily
concerned with making the right
decision.
Buying center member motivation
to engage in buyer behavior is a
function of intrinsic and extrinsic

Krapfel 1985

abilities; group social
influence, rewards,
coalition, and
hierarchical decision
making
information
diffusion, source
credibility, valence

making, group
consensus

problem selfconfidence,
advocacy,
choice

Puto, Patton,
and King 1985

motivation, group motivation is
also dependent on extrinsic
motivation (e.g., rewards).

scenario based survey of 42
buying centers consisting of 2
to 3 members each, within a
single industrial manufacturer
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perceived risk,
supplier
supplier loyalty,
choice
supplier price/quality,
risk avoidance
behavior
Anderson,
problem newness,
Chu, and Weitz information needs,
1987
consideration of
alternatives, buyclass

survey of 271 organizational
buyers across multiple
industries

McCabe 1987

survey of 115 individuals
from 68 buying centers in the
airline and corrugated box
industries

environmental
uncertainty

decision
making
centralization

survey of 169 sales managers
from 16 organizations in the
electronic component
manufacturing industry

Individuals can become advocates
through being provided with more
task relevant information, and
advocacy is related to final group
decisions
When vendor loyalty is high, PMs
award contracts to their preferred
vendor. When loyalty is low, PMs
choose supplier with the highest
perceived value.
New task purchases appear to be
related to larger buying centers,
slower decision making, greater
uncertainty of needs, concerned
with finding a good solution
(rather than price), higher
consideration of alternatives (e.g.,
"outsuppliers"), more influenced
by technical personnel, and less
influenced by purchasing agents.
Higher levels of uncertainty lead
to decentralization of decision
making.

leader behavior,
formalization

McQuisten
1989

product novelty,
complexity, and
importance

individual
participation,
influence

Ronchetto,
Hutt, and
Reingen 1989

centrality, formal
rank, departmental
membership

latent
influence,
manifest
influence

Barclay 1991

organization size,
complexity,
formalization,
centralization;
purchase situation
importance,

conflict
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Michaels, Day,
and
Joachimsthaler
1987
Kohli 1989

individual power;
buying center size,
familiarity, viscidity;
purchase risk, time
pressure, influence
attempt strength

role tress, role
ambiguity,
work
performance
manifest
influence

survey of 1036 members from
the national association of
purchasing managers
survey of 214 individuals
from the national association
of purchasing managers

Positive leader behavior is related
to lower role stress and lower role
ambiguity.

Expert power had the largest
impact in influence.
Reinforcement power had the
second biggest influence. Expert
power has greater impact when
influence attempts are weak while
Reinforcement power has the
strongest impact when influence
attempts are strong.
survey of 182 members within Results showed that both novelty
82 different buying teams that and importance were related to
were customers of one
participation while only
industrial equipment
importance was related to
manufacturer
influence. Research also showed
that greater levels of participation
lead to influence.
interviews with 171 members Both centrality of the buying
of a network within an
center member among the group
electrical systems producer
network as well as formal rank
determine the level of influence of
the buying center member.
Survey of 328 matched pairs
Centralization and differing
(purchasing
reward structures among buying
manager/engineer) from
center members are related to
Ontario Association of
increased conflict. Formalization
Purchasing Managers
can reduce the level of conflict
among buying center members.

Bunn 1993

buyclass

Bunn and
Clopton 1993

purchase importance,
decision time, level
of influence,
negotiation intensity
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Wilson, Lilien,
and Wilson
1991

complexity, novelty,
and product class
buyclass, financial
risk, technical
uncertainty

decision
choice

information
search,
analysis
techniques,
procedural
control,
proactive
focus,
purchase
importance,
task
uncertainty
buyer power,
extensiveness
of choice
information
use

Survey of purchasing teams
from 32 organizations
belonging to the National
Association of Purchasing
Managers, split into groups of
3 (24 groups, 72 participants)
and 2 (8 groups, 16
participants)
Interviews with 11 purchasing
managers and 3 surveys
consisting of 826 members of
the National Association of
Purchasing Managers, from
52 industries

Perceived risk and buyclass
determine the decision making
process likely to be used by
buying centers. For example low
risk re-buys are likely to use
autocratic while high risk new
purchases appear likely to use a
unanimity model.
There are 5 types of analysis used
by buying centers; casual
purchase, routine low priority,
simple modified rebuy, judgmental
new task, complex modified
rebuy. Routine low priority,
modified rebuy, and judgmental
new task follow the original
Robinson, Faris and Wind (1967)
buying models of straight rebuy,
modified rebuy, and new purchase.

Survey of 636 members of
National Association of
Purchasing Managers

Higher levels of purchase
importance and purchase
complexity lead to a wider number
of information sources used.
Lower levels of purchase
importance and complexity lead

organization size,
buyclass, buying
center size

information
sources used,
number of
alternatives
considered,
decision
making time
search effort,
duration of
purchase
process

Weiss and
Heide 1993

compatibility, vendor
switching costs,
experience,
technological change

Kline and
Wagner 1994

experience

information
sources used

Venkatesh,
Kohli, and
Zaltman 1995

power, group
viscidity, familiarity
with target

influence
Strategy
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Dholakia et al.
1993

buying center members to use
personal information sources such
as internal experts or salespeople.
Survey of 1,199
Results showed that as decision
organizational buyers of
making units grow in size, the
telecommunications
greater the number of information
equipment
sources used and the larger the
number of suppliers considered.
All of these factors in turn lead to
longer decision making time.
Survey of 219 key contacts
Overall, information search was
for organizations who had
related to compatibility concerns,
purchased computer
vendor switching costs, and low
workstations across multiple
levels of experience with the
industries
purchase. In turn higher effort
increased the duration of purchase
time.
Survey of 127 buyers of
Buyers with higher levels of
Fashion Group International
experience relied more on their
own knowledge, while salesperson
information and customer needs
were the other significant sources
of information for making buying
decisions
Survey of 187 members of the Individuals with higher referent
National Association of
power used less coercive strategies
Purchasing Managers
(e.g. threats) while those high in
information power used
information exchange, and those
with expert power used
recommendations

Brown 1995

reputation,
salesperson attitude,
experience, product
cognition, purchase
importance, risk,
insupplier/outsupplier
status
technological change,
product
heterogeneity,
compatibility,
switching cost,
purchase importance

attitude
towards
salesperson,
attitude
towards
product

Survey of 379 members of the Purchasing managers were more
National Association of
likely to use extrinsic cues for
Purchasing Managers
decision making with outsuppliers
versus insuppliers.

consideration
set, supplier
choice

Dawes, Lee,
and Dowling
1998

stakeholding,
participation,
innovative
orientation,
decentralization,
formalization,
information control

manifest
influence

Hunter, Bunn,
and Perrault
2006

procedural control,
information search,
proactive focus

formal
analysis

Survey of 219 members of the When technological change is
National Association of
rapid the result is a smaller
Purchasing Managers
consideration set and a higher
probability of choosing an existing
supplier. Prior experience did not
affect decision set. Lack of
experience and centralization lead
to higher search behavior.
Interviews with 98 buying
Results show that individuals with
center members within 41
higher stakeholding in the
organizations (at least 2
purchase participate more in the
members from each buying
buying process, those more
center)
involved in the process tend to
have higher control over
information. Information control is
significantly related to influence
but appears to be low (.10)
Survey of 636 members of
Purchase importance leads to
Institute for Supply Chain
search for information, while
Management
information search, buyer power,
and proactive focus lead to use of
formal analysis of potential
suppliers.

Heide and
Weiss 1995
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Palmatier et al.
2008

industry norms,
reward, salesperson
competence, product
dependence

relationship
orientation

Survey of 269 buyersalesperson dyads from 538
companies, across multiple
industries

Hada, Grewal,
and Lilien
2014

referral valence,
referrer credibility,
insupplier
experience,
outsupplier
reputation

referrer
credibility,
selection
likelihood

Two lab experiments
conducted with MBA
students.

Industry norms and reward
structure were significantly related
to the buyer's relationship
orientation towards the
salesperson.
Supplier referrals matter more for
outsuppliers than insuppliers.
Balanced referrals lead to greater
credibility but all-positive referrals
lead to higher supplier evaluations.
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Figure 2-1: Input-Process-Outcome Model of Organizational Buying Behavior
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3

Selling to Barricaded Buyers

3.1

Introduction

“From the issue date of the solicitation [request for proposal] and until a supplier is selected
for contract award and the selection is made public, suppliers are not allowed to
communicate for any reason with any state staff regarding the solicitation...” (Georgia
Procurement Code 2011, p. 83, emphasis added).
“In 2008, nearly 80% of prescribers (Doctors) were considered accessible. Since then, that
number has declined steadily, and just 47% of physicians are now accessible to sales reps”
(ZS Associates AccessMonitor 2015, p. 1).

As noted above, a common practice in business-to-government (B2G) and business-tobusiness (B2B) transactions is for buyers to restrict suppliers’ access to them during the
buying process. I term these buyers “barricaded buyers.” The incidence of barricaded
buyers is pervasive, especially in the public sector. For instance, a detailed review of
federal and state purchasing practices suggests that buyers restrict access to suppliers
(barricade themselves) in some form or fashion at some point in the buying process (see
Table 3.1). Why are buyers instituting policies that restrict suppliers’ access to them? The
reasons appear to be the desire to increase their control and objective decision making
during the buying process. For example, the state of California states that the restrictions
are in place to create “fair and competitive [buying] processes” (2013 California Institute
for Local Government, p. 1).

Despite its prominence in practice, research related to barricaded buyers remains virtually
non-existent. This may be due to the reliance on classic models of buyer behavior that
implicitly assume that suppliers have unrestricted access to buyers across all stages of the
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sales cycle (e.g., Lilien and Wong 1984; Sheth 1973; Webster and Wind 1972). The
assumption may also be that research on “gatekeepers” addresses this issue (e.g., Dawes,
Lee, and Dowling 1998; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Webster and Wind 1972).
Gatekeepers are typically individuals who control the flow of information into and out of
the buying center (e.g., Kohli 1989). As with classic models of buyer behavior, it is
generally assumed that suppliers have the ability to contact gatekeepers (or other decision
influencers) at any time during the buying process. In contrast, the barricades in the present
research reflect the policies written into the purchasing process that limit supplier access.
Once the barricade is erected, supplier contact with anyone involved in the purchase is
significantly restricted and, in fact, can result in supplier disqualification if the barricade is
violated. As such, the question remains, “How can suppliers sell to barricaded buyers?”
The present research begins to address this question and, in doing so, makes the following
contributions to the literature.

I draw on extensive field work to develop a conceptual framework that highlights actions
a focal supplier can take to gain a competitive advantage when selling to barricaded buyers
(Figure 3.1). The framework identifies key variables across two phases of the buying
process that impact the barricaded buying process. For instance, my results suggest that a
focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood by disclosing novel solutions in its RFP
(request for proposal) response rather than in its pre-RFP sales pitch. Thus, rather than
implying that information sharing is broadly beneficial across all phases of the sales cycle,
this framework suggests that a focal supplier can gain an advantage by strategically
disclosing different types of information at different phases of the buying process.
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Correspondingly, my research also addresses recent calls in the organizational buying and
selling literature to take a more holistic view of the buying process (Franke and Park 2006;
Hall, Ahearne, and Sujan 2015). More specifically, in addition to examining how a
supplier’s actions affect buyers (e.g., Franke and Park 2006; Mullins et al. 2014), I
demonstrate how a supplier’s actions can affect its competitors. For instance, I introduce
the notion of “relationship peacocking” (i.e., the degree to which a supplier signals the
strength of its relationship with the buyer to competitors) and demonstrate how it can
demotivate a supplier’s competitors from responding to an RFP. Thus, I also complement
research that examines competition at the firm level (e.g., Kumar, Jones, Venkatesan, and
Leone 2011) by offering insights into how to impact competition at the transaction level.

In addition, despite recent commentary questioning the significance of RFPs (Solis 2016),
my research corroborates recent research that suggests a reemergence of the importance of
RFPs (Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016). RFPs are especially important in barricaded
buyer settings because buyers must rely more on the written supplier RFP response.
Although prior research documents the importance of RFPs in the buying process (Johnson,
Friend, and Malshe 2016; Leigh and Rethans 1984), examines how buyers use RFPs as an
evaluation tool to narrow down the number of potential suppliers (Crow, Olshavsky, and
Summers 1980; Vyas and Woodside 1984), and demonstrates how RFPs may be used as a
learning tool to develop more fine-grained and updated RFPs (Nutt 1993), the literature
remains limited in a couple of ways. First, research on how suppliers can shape buyer RFPs
ex ante remains largely unaddressed. The present research identifies variables (e.g., unique
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language) that a supplier can use to help buyers craft RFPs in the supplier’s favor. In
addition, the implicit view in prior research is that RFPs are evaluated in an objective
fashion ex post (e.g., lowest price, fastest delivery, and performance ratings) (Vyas and
Woodside 1984). This research, however, suggests that subjective factors (e.g., tone,
explicitness, and tailoring) may be as or more important than objective factors when
making decisions. Somewhat ironically, therefore, buyers who barricade themselves in an
effort to be more objective, may unknowingly increase their reliance on subjective factors
when making decisions.

Due to the limited research on barricaded buyers during the organizational buying process,
I use a qualitative research approach to build my conceptual framework (e.g., Gebhardt,
Carpenter, and Sherry 2006; Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007). My findings and
contributions are based on a longitudinal participant observation of eight organizational
purchases within a large public organization. The data collection encompasses multiple
sources, including 46 depth interviews, 22 observations of buyer meetings, and analysis of
29 supplier RFP responses over a period of approximately eighteen months.

3.2

Method

The present research develops a conceptual model of selling to barricaded buyers through
a qualitative, grounded-theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin
1998) using case study methodology (Eisenhardt 1989; Narayandas and Rangan 2004). As
in the present case, grounded-theory is best utilized when there is little existing knowledge
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of the topic or when there are significant knowledge gaps (Strauss and Corbin 1998).
Below, I provide additional details about the research setting, case selection, and data
collection and analysis.

3.2.1

Research Setting

Our data collection took place within a large state organization that employs over 14,000
people, and operates departments responsible for education, healthcare, law enforcement,
construction, agriculture, and transportation, among others. The organization manages
purchasing contracts totaling approximately $2 billion worth of products and services
across all departments. I partnered with this organization because it uses a barricaded
buying process and provided the opportunity to examine a variety of cases across diverse
purchasing contexts (see Table 3.2). The organization follows state purchasing guidelines
and processes that are consistent with those highlighted in Table 3.1. Therefore, my
findings are likely to be applicable to buying and selling processes across most state and
federal purchases involving RFPs.1

3.2.2

1

Case Selection

An important distinction in the present research is the difference between the Request for Proposal (RFP)
process and the Request for Quote (RFQ), also known as the Invitation for Bid (IFB), process. In the public
sector, RFPs are generally used “[to] obtain complex services in which professional expertise is needed and
may vary,” whereas RFQ/IFBs are generally used “[to] obtain simple, common, or routine services that may
require personal or mechanical skills. Little discretion is used in performing the work” (California
Procurement Code, p. 52). Generally, the RFP process is used for modified rebuy and new purchases, which
is why we focus solely on RFPs.
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I used a theoretical, rather than random, sampling procedure to provide a rich, diverse set
of cases for the present research (Eisenhardt 1989). Specifically, I relied on two factors
consistently linked to organizational buying behaviors and outcomes: buyclass (e.g., new
purchase or rebuy) and type of purchase (i.e., products or services), in order to select cases.
Buyclass and type of purchase are important considerations because they both affect the
decision-making processes used in supplier selection (e.g., Anderson, Chu, and Weitz
1987; Vyas and Woodside 1984).

3.2.3

Data Collection and Analysis

Prior to collecting data, I conducted several meetings with the Chief Purchasing Officer
(CPO) and two procurement managers within the buying organization. The purpose of
these meetings was to familiarize ourselves with the organization’s purchasing process.
Procurement managers primarily serve an administrative function by acting as project
managers in charge of ensuring buying center members follow procurement protocols laid
out by the organization and the state. 2 In this organization, procurement managers are
purposely excluded from direct decision-making. This process is consistent with those
found at the federal level and in other states.

Buying centers typically included individuals across the organization who had expertise in
the product or service being purchased and/or those who would be affected by it. For

2

State organizations are each governed by a set of purchasing regulations determined by the State
Procurement Division. Organizational rules may also be applied to the required state regulations.
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instance, in the general office software case, the buying center included the director of the
department that would be using the software the most, an employee within the director’s
department who would be working with the software program on a daily basis, an IT
manager who would assist in implementation, and two potential users from other
departments. Buying center members were tasked with making the ultimate decision.
Typically, each buying center member voted on a supplier with the winning supplier
receiving the most votes.

The first author was granted full access to the buying process for each of the eight cases.
This was achieved by adding the first author to the buying center as a full, non-voting
member of each buying center. Access included the ability to collect direct and indirect
communications for the duration of each case. Indirect communications included email
correspondence among buying center members and between purchasing and suppliers, the
written RFP sent to suppliers, and the written responses received from suppliers. Direct
communication included individual interviews with buying center members at multiple
points in the process, observation of buying center meetings, and observation of meetings
with potential suppliers.

Individual interviews followed the semi-structured interview process. The following
questions were used as a guide: Please describe how you gathered information to develop
the RFP; What specifications are/were important to consider for this purchase?; What did
suppliers provide that was (un)helpful in evaluating the RFPs?; What are your overall
perceptions of suppliers based on their RFP responses? In total, I conducted 46 interviews
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across 31 buying center members of the eight cases resulting in approximately 18 hours of
interview data (see Table 2). Most interviews were recorded using an IC Digital Voice
Recorder with audio files transcribed verbatim. For those interviewees who declined to be
recorded (five total), I took extensive notes and audio recorded field notes within 15
minutes of interview completion.

Consistent with prior research (e.g., Challagalla, Murtha, and Jaworski 2014), I analyzed
the data via open, axial, and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin 1998). To begin the open
coding process, I read through the transcripts independently to familiarize myself with the
data. Once a level of familiarity was achieved, I identified high level concepts within the
data. Next, I conducted axial coding that involves relating higher level categories to each
other and to subcategories along more specific properties and dimensions. Finally, I
conducted selective coding, which involves developing a theoretical framework through
the identification of key variables within the data. Open, axial, and selective coding were
performed through an iterative process whereby emerging themes were coded individually,
followed by ongoing analysis throughout data collection to tighten the theoretical
framework. This coding process has been used frequently in previous marketing research
to provide important insights into novel phenomena (e.g., Homburg, Wilczek, and Hahn
2014; Ulaga and Reinartz 2011). To facilitate the coding process, I used QSR
International’s NVivo® 11 software. This process yielded a conceptual model that
highlights important variables and mechanisms in the barricaded buying process (see
Figure 3.1). The result of this process was development of ten research propositions that
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focus on how suppliers can increase their selection likelihood when selling to barricaded
buyers (see Table 3.3 for list of propositions).

3.2.4

Purchasing Process in the Present Setting

The traditional view of the buying process involves a number of steps, which typically
includes the following activities: identification of a need, development of specifications
that form a solution, identification of suppliers that may provide a solution, evaluation of
suppliers, and final selection of a supplier or suppliers (Choffray and Lilien 1980; Crow,
Olshavsky, and Summers 1980; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Sheth 1973; Vyas and
Woodside 1984; Webster and Wind 1972). Traditional buying process models also
implicitly assume that suppliers have relatively unrestricted access to buyers across these
steps (Moriarty and Spekman 1984). The barricaded buying context, however, is quite
different.

Buyers may barricade themselves (i.e., restrict suppliers’ access) at any of point in the
buying process. As is the case in many public organizations, the organization in the present
research barricaded its buyers after the RFP was announced and made publicly available.
Thus, until the announcement of the RFP, suppliers had relatively broad access to buying
center members. As such, I focus on two key phases in the present research: the pre-RFP
(or pre-barricade) phase and the post-RFP (or post-barricade) phase.3 In the pre-RFP phase,

3

In the present context, the post-RFP phase was particularly restricted. For instance, in the post-RFP phase,
a buyer with a question for a supplier needed to write and submit the question(s) to a central procurement
officer, who then forwarded the question to the supplier. The supplier, in turn, had to submit its response in
writing to the procurement officer, who then forwarded the response to the buying team member.
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buying center members sought to identify potential suppliers and began developing
specifications that addressed their need(s) in the form of an RFP. In the post-RFP phase,
buyers shifted their attention to the evaluation of suppliers and making a final selection.

3.3

Conceptual Framework

In the following sections, I integrate insights from my fieldwork to develop a conceptual
framework (see Figure 3.1). I take the perspective of a focal supplier vying for a buyer’s
business against other suppliers. This framework proposes two underlying mechanisms
through which suppliers can impact their selection likelihood: reducing competitive
intensity in the pre-RFP phase and enhancing RFP response quality in the post-RFP phase.

Competitive intensity, as conceptualized here, refers to the degree of rivalry among
suppliers bidding for a particular purchasing contract. Although competitive intensity is
generally examined at the firm level (e.g., Grewal and Tansuhaj 2001; Kumar et al. 2011),
my research suggests that it has significant implications at the transaction level as well. In
particular, a focal supplier can increase its likelihood of selection by reducing the number
and/or motivation of competing suppliers pursuing the contract (i.e., reducing competitive
intensity).

Respondents in the present research suggested that this (laborious) process often precluded them from
asking questions.
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RFP response quality refers to the buyer’s evaluation of the overall superiority of the RFP
response from a supplier (e.g., Zeithaml 1988). In the post-RFP phase, suppliers are less
able to influence their competitors; therefore, they need to distinguish themselves by
focusing their efforts on developing a quality RFP response. These overarching insights
lay the foundation for a more in-depth discussion, which follows next.

3.4

Results

I divide the discussion of results into two phases: 1) the pre-RFP phase and 2) the postRFP phase. Within each phase, I identify novel variables under the control of a focal
supplier that ultimately impact selection likelihood. I begin with the pre-RFP phase.

3.4.1

Pre-RFP Phase

As previously mentioned, suppliers have relatively broad access to buyers in the pre-RFP
phase of the buying process. This is due to the fact there is no official purchase to be made;
thus, there are few rules restricting buyer-supplier interactions. In this phase, buying center
members are typically engaged in information search behavior in order to gather enough
information to develop specifications for the RFP. My research shows that this information
search behavior by buyers provides suppliers with unique opportunities to enhance their
competitive position –via RFP shaping and competitor perception shaping – thereby
resulting in greater selection likelihood.
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3.4.2

RFP shaping

RFP shaping is the degree to which a supplier influences the content contained in the
buyer’s formal RFP. Influencing the content of the RFP is important because it can
preclude competitors from responding effectively to the RFP. The present research
identifies two key ways that suppliers can shape the RFP –by instilling their unique
language and by focusing on their unique capabilities.

3.4.3

Unique Language

Unique language refers to terminology for products and services that is distinctive to a
specific supplier. The present research suggests that a supplier can reduce competitive
intensity if buyers include its unique language in their formal RFPs. Suppliers can increase
their likelihood that buyers will include their unique language in their RFPs in a couple of
ways. Buying center members often came from various parts of the participating
organization and had very little purchasing experience. Thus, they frequently asked
vendors to give product demonstrations (e.g., software demonstrations) and/or to provide
them with sample RFPs they had responded to in other instances. For example, the buying
committee chair in the general office software case, who included a supplier’s unique
language in his buying center’s RFP, described the process he used to develop the RFP:
I had never done an RFP before so I started piecing it together from multiple
sources…. The supplier demo, the sample RFP from the [demo] supplier…
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By educating buyers via product demonstrations and other materials, a supplier familiarizes
buyers with its unique language, which increases the likelihood the buyer will incorporate
this language into its formal RFP. When a focal supplier’s unique language is included in
an RFP, it becomes difficult for competitors to respond effectively because they are less
clear about what buyers are asking for. As such, competing suppliers may be unable to
identify appropriate solutions which can preclude them from submitting an RFP response
at all.

In addition, a focal supplier who is able to instill its unique language into an RFP gains an
advantage because buyers understand the supplier’s solution (in the post-RFP phase). The
buying committee chair in the general office software case elaborated:
When we looked at [the] proposal, some of the language, we kind of knew
what they were talking about when they would say dash 4 or whatever,
because we had seen what those [screens] look like. I mean we kind of knew
what we were looking at when we got an RFP, because you know RFPs,
there are very few screen shots. Sometimes it could be hard to relate the
language that you see in an RFP to an actual visual product that you're
purchasing, so that helps for the [suppliers] that we had [met with] prior to
the RFP.
As a result of instilling its unique language into the buyer’s formal RFP, a focal supplier
can decrease the competitive intensity of the transaction by decreasing its competitors’
motivation and capability of submitting a quality RFP response (Chen, Tsu, and Tsai 2007;
Smith, Ferrier, Ndofor 2001). These assertions align with existing theories of
communication and motivation within work settings. For instance, prior research suggests
that individuals who work together often develop a shared language (Wiersema and Bantel
1992). This shared language has positive outcomes on work performance because there is
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greater understanding of the task (Barrick et al. 1998). In contrast, individuals who have
difficulty understanding the task are likely to feel unmotivated to complete the work, and
may give up on the work altogether (Thomas and Velthouse 1990). Formally,

P1: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood by increasing buyer
familiarity with its unique language during the pre-RFP phase.

3.4.4

Unique Capabilities

Our research suggests that a focal supplier can benefit by focusing its efforts on
communicating the value of its unique capabilities to buyers in the pre-RFP phase. Unique
capabilities are firm-specific competencies and/or skills that provide an advantage over the
competitors (Makadok 2001; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997). Communicating unique
capabilities is beneficial for suppliers because it can induce buyers to include them as
requirements in the RFP. As a result, competitors are likely to be less motivated and less
capable of developing quality RFP responses (Chen 1996; Chen, Tsu, and Tsai 2007;
Smith, Ferrier, Ndofor 2001). For example, in the pest control case, Supplier 1 promoted
its round-the-clock service (a capability unique to them). This capability was subsequently
included in the formal RFP. Consequently, one competitor [Supplier 2] alerted the
purchasing manager they would not be submitting an RFP response due to their perceived
inability to offer the solution requested. The committee chair provided additional insights
as follows:
I think [our RFP] evolved into so much more than what [Supplier 2]
expected. [We added] the 24/7 365 emergency call requirement offered by
[Supplier 1], which probably drove [Supplier 2] away. We requested that
they [the RFP responders] are available all the time which most suppliers
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likely can’t or don’t want to do. Companies don’t want to handle [unique
situations], it takes a special person to do that.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, suppliers frequently “shot themselves in the foot” by
identifying needs for which they were not uniquely capable of addressing. For instance, in
the general office software case, a focal supplier identified the buyer’s need for
customization (a need the focal supplier could address). As a result, the buying committee
chair wrote the following question directly into the RFP that was distributed to all potential
suppliers:
Describe the system configurations and customizations. Applications
should be flexible, scalable, and configurable for ease of use of the end
users.
Unfortunately, in this purchasing project, the result was the selection of a competitor who
was able to provide a superior level of customization over the focal supplier who had
originally identified the need. The focal supplier in question had identified a need for which
it was at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, it is important for suppliers to elicit needs and
offer capabilities in the pre-RFP phase that they are uniquely able to address in order
preclude competitors from effectively responding.

P2: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater focus on
its unique capabilities during the pre-RFP phase.

While P2 is somewhat straightforward, it provides the foundation for a broader discussion
about strategic information disclosure. Strategic information disclosure is the
thoughtfulness and timeliness with which a focal supplier provides information to buyers.
Although prior research on buyer behavior naturally highlights the importance of
identifying customer needs in order to identify solutions (Sheth 1973; Tuli, Kohli, and
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Bharadwaj 2007; Ulaga and Reinartz 2011; Webster and Wind 1972), rarely does it specify
when suppliers need to convey what types of information about the solution in order to
ensure supplier success in the face of competition. As a result of the present exploration, it
is apparent that suppliers can enhance their competitive position by identifying unique
information in the pre-RFP phase in order to shape the buyer’s RFP in their favor.
However, if the information is not unique, suppliers may benefit from withholding the
information until a later time when competitors are incapable of responding with their own
solution (discussed in the post-RFP section).

3.4.5

Competitor Perception Shaping

Competitor perception shaping is the degree to which a focal supplier influences
competitors’ beliefs about its connection to the buying organization. I identify two
behaviors that shape competitor perceptions and, in turn, their motivation to engage in the
transaction: relationship peacocking and information peacocking.

3.4.6

Relationship peacocking

Relationship peacocking is the degree to which a supplier signals the strength of its
relationship with the buyer to competitors. It is common practice for government purchases
to have a pre-RFP meeting or series of meetings with potential suppliers (which may
include facilities walk-throughs and/or inspections) in order to clarify complex information
that will be included in the RFP. These meetings also allow suppliers to ask any clarifying
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questions they may have prior to responding to the RFP. They are attended by most, if not
all, competing suppliers, which provides opportunities to shape competitors’ perceptions.4
I reviewed state purchasing policies to identify the prevalence of these pre-RFP
conferences. In my review I noted that all state purchasing policies at the state and federal
level mentioned the potential for pre-RFP meetings (see Table 3.4).

For instance, during one of these meetings in the waste management case, the incumbent
supplier confidently discussed its chances of keeping the account. When I subsequently
asked a member of the buying team why the supplier was exhibiting this behavior, he
offered:
I think it's just arrogance and entitlement on the part of the CEO of the
[incumbent supplier]. He has connections inside the [buying organization]
that go beyond his business connections, and he's just kind of resting on
some of those laurels since they [competitors] know about it.

Consequently, one of the suppliers who was present during the pre-RFP meeting chose not
to submit an RFP response. The purchasing manager reached out to this supplier to inquire
why it chose not to respond to the RFP. The supplier explained that it felt it would not be
able to submit a competitive RFP response against the incumbent.5

4

In many cases, pre-RFP meetings require attendance by suppliers in order to submit an RFP response later
in the process.
5
In this case, the incumbent won the deal despite the negative impression peacocking evoked from the buying
team. Note that peacocking behavior is most likely to come from an incumbent; however, this need not
always be the case. For example, a supplier might have established a good relationship with a buyer outside
of work, or from previous sales encounters for other products at the current buying organization. In some
cases, a supplier might have developed a relationship with a buyer when the buyer was at a different
organization.
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3.4.7

Information Peacocking

Information peacocking is the degree to which a supplier signals the strength of its
knowledge about the buyer to competitors. In both the waste management and pest control
cases, a supplier made explicit comments about how much it knew about the buyer’s
account. For example, the incumbent supplier in the pest control case took over much of
the buyer’s two-hour initial facility walkthrough. The supplier even corrected the
purchasing manager about information that was incorrect:

Procurement Manager:
Supplier 1:
Procurement Manager:

As you will note on page 6 of the proposal we are
requesting service for seven buildings.
It says seven, but the current service is for eight
buildings. I think that needs to be corrected.
Oh, you are correct, I don’t think that number got
updated.

The supplier also made several comments about the level of service the buying organization
was receiving throughout the walkthrough. It mentioned that the buying organization
received service every 30 days for each building and often required “spot checks” for areas
that could be potential future problems. These comments made a strong impression on the
buyers who were present during this meeting and were mentioned several months later
when the buying center met to evaluate RFP responses:
[Supplier 1] was Johnny on the spot with his walkthrough. You can
definitely tell that [they] know our account inside and out.

Presumably, these comments also made a strong impression on competitors because seven
of the eight suppliers chose not to even respond to this RFP.
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Although I am unaware of peacocking behavior in extant marketing literature, such
behavior has a foundation in the interpersonal relationship literature on mate retention
(Buss 1988; Buss and Shackelford 1997; Sela et al. 2017). Mate retention tactics are those
behaviors individuals exhibit to prevent a partner from getting involved with someone else
(Buss 1988). By using a retention tactic, such as relationship peacocking, a supplier signals
the strength of its customer relationship to competitors. Similar tactics used to protect
interpersonal relationships have been shown to reduce a competitor’s motivation to try to
“poach” a mate (Buss and Shackelford 1997). My observations in the organizational buying
and selling context appear congruent with these findings. Thus, suppliers who use a
peacocking strategy may reduce their competitor’s motivation to invest time and effort into
their RFP response and, in fact, may demotivate competitors from responding at all. As a
result, suppliers can decrease competitive intensity and increase their selection likelihood.
More formally, I propose:

P3: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use
of relationship peacocking during the pre-RFP phase.
P4: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of
information peacocking during the pre-RFP phase.

3.4.8

Post-RFP Phase

In the post-RFP phase, suppliers have very little access to buying team members (i.e.,
buying teams barricade themselves in this phase).6 As a result, competitors are generally

6

As mentioned, this phase is highly formalized in the public/government sector because it is governed by the
state procurement code. The state procurement code for the participating organization precludes buying
team members from having any direct contact with suppliers until after the buying process is complete. Any
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unaware of each other’s actions and, as such, unable to respond to them. For example,
suppliers do not know the content of other suppliers’ RFP responses or whether they
submitted an RFP response at all. The present research suggests that a focal supplier can
take advantage of its competitors’ inability to respond by focusing on key variables that
are particularly influential to the buyers’ perceptions of RFP responses.

3.4.9

RFP Response

Through my interviews and observations of buying center meetings, RFP response quality
was a consistent topic of discussion. Recall that RFP response quality refers to the buyer’s
evaluation of the overall superiority of the RFP response from a supplier (e.g., Zeithaml
1988). The present research suggests two sets of variables that can significantly impact
RFP response quality – RFP content and delivery. RFP content refers to what is included
in the RFP response, while RFP delivery refers to the presentation of the content. I
identified novel solutions, consummate solutions, and reference congruency as important
content factors that impact RFP response quality. Somewhat surprisingly, buying team
members focused much, if not more, of their attention on the delivery of the content in the
RFP responses. Correspondingly, the present research suggests RFP response tone,
explicitness, and tailoring as important delivery variables associated with RFP response
quality. Careful attention to RFP content and delivery can increase the perceived quality of
the RFP, thereby increasing a supplier’s selection likelihood.

unauthorized contact leads to the dismissal of buyers from the decision-making process. This language is
common across many states’ procurement codes (see Table 3.1).
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3.4.10 Content: Novel Solutions

Novel solutions are supplier offerings that address customer needs in an imaginative way.
I find that buyer perceptions of RFP response quality are significantly enhanced when
novel solutions are included in a supplier’s RFP response. To be most effective, the present
research suggests that suppliers should offer novel solutions in the RFP response, rather
than in the pre-RFP phase. Doing so precludes competitors from responding to the novel
solution, thereby enhancing the perceived quality of the supplier’s RFP. If a focal supplier
discloses a novel solution to the buyer in the pre-RFP phase, it may lose its advantage if
the solution is included as a requirement in the RFP. To illustrate, a supplier in the waste
management case provided a novel solution in its RFP response that could save the buying
organization money over time. By withholding this novel customer solution until the postRFP phase, the supplier gained an advantage over its competitors because no other
competitors offered a similar solution in their RFP responses. A buying center member
elaborated on how the novel solution distinguished the supplier:
But this other vendor [Supplier 2] offered more services. And so some of
those services, for example, weights, so that when you’re tipping dumpsters,
you’re able to determine the exact weights of each tip. You can use that
information to optimize your routes and determine if you’re tipping air or if
you can cut your frequencies. And we currently don’t have that. And
unfortunately, we didn’t write that in our RFP to begin with to require that.
We did ask for collaborative processes and so this other company offered
that as one possible thing. But because they offered that and the other
company didn't, that was one of the things, in my opinion, that contributed
to a wide gap in the [RFP responses].
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In this situation, Supplier 2 enjoyed an advantage by providing a novel solution –an
advantage which would have likely been forgone had they disclosed it in the pre-RFP
phase. Here, the focal supplier created an advantage by strategically disclosing a novel
solution when their competitors were unable to respond. While their competitors may have
been able to provide a similar solution, they were unaware and, as such, did not provide
one. Based on these findings I formally propose:

P5: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of
novel solutions in its RFP response.

3.4.11 Content: Consummate Solutions

Consummate solutions are supplier offerings that go above and beyond what is required by
the RFP. Recent research highlights the importance of providing such discretionary effort
because it can enhance customer satisfaction (Kashyap and Murtha 2017). Somewhat
surprisingly, I found that the majority of supplier RFP responses simply answered the
questions as written (i.e., perfunctory compliance). This may be explained by the literature
on obedience, which highlights individuals’ proclivity to simply follow directions (Blass
1999) and, perhaps, even follow directions to the point of causing personal discomfort
(Slater et al. 2006). What buyers really appreciated, however, were suppliers who provided
solutions that went beyond the requirements in the RFP. For instance, in the waste
management case, the buyer requested a weekly report as part of the service agreement.
Two of the three suppliers responded that they could provide the report as requested. The
third supplier chose to take a different approach. It offered a solution that went above and
beyond what the RFP had requested. As one buying center member noted:
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I think they [focal supplier] met requirements first, [they] answered the
questions that were posed to them, and then they said, ‘And also, we can
offer you this and also we can offer this…’ So that was sort of the other
thing that stood out to me… it just seems clear that there were more
resources that they have available than [the other suppliers].

In this case, the focal supplier offered both weekly reporting, as well as the ability to
provide customized reports that buyers could generate themselves. In the general office
software case, a buying center member mentioned the value added from a supplier who
took a similar approach:
I thought one thing that was helpful was [Supplier 4] provided an alternate
proposal. The alternate proposal was pretty much take two steps back and
think about your overall needs, not just your needs for these two systems. I
actually, when [procurement manager] said there was an alternate proposal
from [Supplier 4], I was like, “That’s weird,” but actually it was valuable in
the overall thinking about what we were doing. No one else did that.

Thus, suppliers who take the initiative and voluntarily go beyond the requirements of the
RFP can increase the buyer’s quality perceptions of their RFP response. This approach
appears beneficial for two reasons. First, when buyers barricade themselves, other suppliers
are generally unaware of a focal supplier’s discretionary RFP response efforts. As a result,
they are less likely to offer similar solutions in their own RFP responses, thus creating an
advantage for the focal supplier. In addition, buyers view consummate solutions in terms
of exceeding expectations (i.e., positive disconfirmation) (Anderson and Sullivan 1993;
Oliver 1980), which signals that the potential supplier is likely to be a good partner. Since
buyers have limited access to suppliers, they must use alternative methods to evaluate
which suppliers will be good suppliers to work with, something they would have normally
tried to do through face-to-face interaction. By withholding consummate solutions until the
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post-RFP phase, suppliers can increase their chances of exceeding buyer expectations and,
consequently, enhance their selection likelihood.

P6: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of
consummate solutions in its RFP response.

3.4.12 Content: Reference Congruency

A final important content piece of the supplier RFP response was reference congruency,
which refers to the degree of similarity between the buying organization and the
organizations provided as references in the supplier’s RFP response (Kumar, Peterson, and
Leone 2013). This issue was first mentioned during my initial interview with the committee
chair of the veterinary services RFP. She mentioned that one thing she wanted to see in the
supplier RFP responses was references that were similar in size and scope to the buying
organization. I later observed the reason for these intentions. It appeared that when
suppliers provided references different in size and scope from the buying firm, buyers
perceived this as an indication that the supplier may lack the adequate experience to service
their needs. For instance, a buying team member for the networking hardware case
commented:
I'm pretty sure that [supplier 1] has worked with more organizations and
they've got their product in more organizations of our size. That kind of
thing. For [supplier 2], they kept going back to this one reference, this one
example, ‘oh you can contact this group for this. You can contact the same
group for this.’ I'm trying to remember it was some kind of institute or
whatever. It wasn't a public organization like we were. It was something
else. That jumped out at me too. We definitely need a vendor that has more
experience working with large public organizations.
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This theme was common across buying center meetings. For instance, a member of the
buying center for the general office software case mentioned:

One thing I noticed is that [Supplier 1] provided a reference for [Public
Organization 1] which is small compared to us, [Supplier 2] gave [Public
Organization 2] as a reference, which feels more like us.

References that were more prominent and/or prestigious than the buying organization often
triggered fears of supplier inattentiveness to the buyer’s account. For instance, the IT
manager buying center member for a network hardware case expressed his concerns thusly:

I feel that [Supplier 1] and [Supplier 2] aren’t focused on this [project]. For
example, [Supplier 2] gave [very prestigious organization] as a reference.
So if [very prestigious organization] calls, I feel we would get bumped to
the bottom of the queue. I think we’d be a small fish in a large pond with
[Supplier 1] and [Supplier 2].

It is clear that the references suppliers include in their RFP responses convey important
information to buyers (whether the references are contacted or not). The findings of the
present research reinforce recent research suggesting that congruent references are more
valuable than non-congruent references (Hada, Grewal, and Lilien 2014) and that
incongruent references engender negative buyer perceptions (Johnson, Friend, and Malshe
2016). The present research suggests that reference congruency may be particularly
important in barricaded buying environments. When buyers are barricaded, they rely
heavily on the references suppliers provide to get a sense of supplier capabilities. Thus, in
barricaded environments, it becomes even more important for suppliers to include
congruent references in their RFP responses because they may not get the opportunity to
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amend buyer perceptions, or to respond to the negative inferences buyers make about the
supplier as a result of incongruent references.

P7: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater reference
congruency in its RFP response.

3.4.13 Delivery: Tone

Tone refers to the buyer’s perception of the supplier’s attitude conveyed in its RFP
response. The tone of suppliers’ responses is an important factor in the buying team’s
decision-making. As one buying center member in the networking hardware case noted:

Someone who didn't provide a good RFP response was [Supplier 1].
[Supplier 1’s] response was pretty much abysmal. They seemed mad in their
response.

In the general office software case, supplier tone was brought up immediately during the
initial meeting to evaluate supplier RFP responses. A buying center member’s reaction to
the negatively toned response was as follows:

[Supplier 2] is eliminated in my mind… they came across as really arrogant
in their RFP [response]. For example, for our question about bankruptcy
they just put “we’re not going to answer that.” What type of response is
that? [see actual RFP response, below]

This reaction was echoed by several other members of the committee. Following the
meeting, I identified RFP responses that buyers indicated as having different tones. The
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following is a comparison of responses to the RFP question, “Explain the consequences for
the organization should the offeror be sold or go out of business?”

Positively perceived supplier tone:
While there are no plans for a sale of the company and [Supplier 1] is in a
very strong and well capitalized financial position to mitigate the risk of
going out of business, our contracts are written such that product support
and hosting would be provided to the customer for as long as the current
term of the contract.
Negatively perceived supplier tone:
[Supplier 2] does not engage in this speculation.

In barricaded buyer settings, suppliers must be careful in the way they write their RFPs.
Answers that come across as short or negative are interpreted by buyers as evidence the
supplier is not fully engaged in the buying process. Unfortunately, the barricade allows few
opportunities to change the negative impressions buyers form as a result of poorly
perceived tone.

The importance of tone in the present research aligns well with existing communications
research. When individuals receive written messages, they often use perceived tone in
evaluating the intended meaning of the message sender (Byron 2008). More importantly
for the present research context, individuals respond more favorably to written messages
perceived as having a positive tone (Butts, Becker, and Bowell 2015). Since barricaded
buyers rely heavily on the written word in RFPs to evaluate suppliers, it makes sense that
RFP tone is likely to impact RFP response quality. Based on this discussion I propose the
following:
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P8: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of
positive tone in its RFP response.

3.4.14 Delivery: Explicitness

In addition to tone, the importance of RFP explicitness was commonly alluded to during
the post-RFP selection phase. RFP explicitness refers to the degree to which buyers have a
clear understanding of what the supplier is offering in its RFP responses. Buying center
members noted different aspects of suppliers’ RFP responses when determining how
explicit they were. In the commercial printing case, for example, one supplier provided a
tri-fold brochure as a sample of its print capabilities. However, the committee was most
interested in the supplier’s ability to print large signs, which was not clear from the tri-fold
sample. The inclusion of clarifying visuals, such as screenshots for software, detailed
descriptions of processes, and clearly formatted responses to RFP specifications enhance
the explicitness of suppliers’ responses. A manager involved in the waste management RFP
provided his insights accordingly:
The biggest differences [between proposals] were both the content, and sort
of the formatting, and actual language used. Yeah. [Supplier 1] works
differently – it’s much more clear, and descriptive, and detailed, again,
much more concrete in the way that they provide service, they do pickups,
where they’re taking them, how it’s processed once they get there, what
they do in case of emergencies and delays. And I mean, we had org. charts
to look at and route maps to look at, and as small as that might-- as petty as
that may sound, it makes the details that much more clear.

An IT manager in the specialized software case offered similar sentiments:
I do think that the quality of the RFP, not necessarily what they’re willing
to offer, but the quality of how the look and feel of the RFP, the narrative
really helps make the decision I think. The ones that were hard to follow
and understand, were messy, were the ones that ended up on the bottom of
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my list...I couldn’t get a true sense at what they were trying to say in the
RFP. Whereas those that were laid out with tables and examples and
formatted nicely were the ones that rose to the top because I could clearly
see and understand what they were trying to say in the narrative.
The following responses to the question in the waste management RFP, “Please explain
how your company provides accurate and timely reporting,” further illustrate the difference
between more and less explicit responses by suppliers:
More explicit RFP response:
[Supplier] has numerous automated reporting options to choose from that
can be utilized to meet [buyer’s] needs. The first option is through the Web
Based Customer Portal reporting system. Through this option, [buyer] can
retrieve, at their convenience, detailed data reports that can be downloaded
into Excel or full image to PDF…
Less explicit RFP response:
We will provide any and all requested information from [buyer].

As highlighted by the previous examples, explicit RFP responses are easier for buyers to
evaluate. Explicit responses positively affect buyer impressions of the supplier because
they instill confidence in the supplier’s abilities and make clear what is offered. The
information processing and decision-making literature reinforce the importance of
explicitness. For instance, prior research suggests that information that is easy to
understand results in more favorable product evaluations (Anand and Sternthal 1990; Hong
and Sternthal 2010). Moreover, when information is difficult to process, individuals may
switch preferences (Johnson, Payne, and Bettman 1988). When buyers are unbarricaded,
less explicit RFP responses may be remedied through additional discussion and
clarification. Barricaded buyers, in contrast, do not have this luxury and, as such, must
interpret supplier responses on their own. As a result, the greater the level of explicitness,
the greater are buyer perceptions of RFP quality. Thus, I propose:
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P9: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater explicitness
in its RFP response.

3.4.15 Delivery: Tailoring

Another common theme pervading discussions with and among buying team members
about RFP delivery was the perceived level of tailoring in suppliers’ RFP responses. RFP
response tailoring refers to the degree to which buyers feel an RFP response is customized
to their organization. When suppliers submit highly tailored RFP responses, buyers view
these suppliers as more committed to the purchase and the buying organization. In contrast,
buying center members often objected to “canned” responses as they seemed generic and
unhelpful (also see Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016). As a consequence, buyers question
how well the supplier knows their account, and perceive the supplier as lazy and indifferent
about winning the business. A manager in the network hardware case elaborated:
You take [Supplier 4] for instance… they did a lot of copying and pasting.
When they don’t know some of the nuances, that’s kind of a warning...In
the case of the [Supplier 4] response, you get stuff where they literally, it’s
like they didn't read the RFP, they were just doing cutting and pasting.

To illustrate further, consider a particular section of the RFP for the network hardware case
which stated, “These are the general areas of activity for which the [buyer] may seek
assistance for the networking services provider to administer for the [buyer]. These areas
are described in Section 7.0. Describe in narrative form how your firm will perform the
proposed services.” The following responses from two different suppliers demonstrate
differences in tailoring.
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Highly tailored response:
In regards to Financing and Leasing, the [Buyer] has an executed Master
Lease Agreement with [Supplier 1], which will be the basis for any lease or
financing transaction resulting from this RFP. We look forward to working
closely with the [Buyer] to meet your leasing and financing needs. As
required in Section 4.6.2, [Supplier 1] will offer a Tax-Exempt Lease
Purchase for a financing period of 60 months with a $1.00 buyout at the end
of the five year term. Per the answers to the submitted questions, [Supplier
1] will provide 3, 4, or 5 annual payments based on [Buyer]’s preferences.
Given there is not a specific configuration and quote being offered,
[Supplier 1] anticipates providing a 0% interest rate, but that is subject to
specific quotes generated as a result of this RFP.
Poorly tailored response:
[Supplier 2] is offering Procurement and Lease Services.

As noted in the highly tailored response, the supplier mentions the buyer by name and also
references questions that came up in the pre-RFP phase of the buying process.
Alternatively, Supplier 2 does not mention any specific information about the buyer or this
particular purchase.

In concert with the results of the present research, prior research suggests that tailoring
messages enhances the receivers’ perceptions of the sender (Godfrey, Seiders, and Voss
2011; Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016; Song and Zinkhan 2008). These enhanced
perceptions result from the receiver’s appreciation of the sender’s effort to tailor, which
they may reciprocate by increasing their purchase intentions (Godfrey, Seiders, and Voss
2011). As mentioned, barricaded buyers often rely heavily on the written RFP responses to
develop supplier perceptions. If buyers perceive a lack of effort or interest stemming from
a poorly tailored RFP response, there are few opportunities for suppliers to overcome this
issue. Thus, tailored RFP responses become particularly important when buyers barricade
themselves in the post-RFP phase. As a result of my findings I propose the following:
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P10: A focal supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater tailoring
of its RFP response.

3.5

Discussion

Dealing with barricaded buyers is common for suppliers doing business in the public
sector, and is increasingly common within the private sector. The purpose of this research
was to explore the barricaded buying environment in order to begin answering the question,
“How can suppliers sell to buyers they have limited access to?” An examination of eight
organizational purchases in the public sector provides significant insights into how
suppliers can affect buying outcomes when selling to these barricaded buyers. The results
of my research suggest that while suppliers may be restricted from accessing buyers
directly, they may nevertheless have a significant opportunity to influence the buying
process in their favor. This occurs with the caveat that suppliers must be strategic about the
information they provide to buyers because it affects both competition and buyer
perceptions. Below, I provide implications for theory and practice, discuss the limitations
of the present research, and offer future research directions.

3.5.1

Theoretical Implications

Despite its pervasiveness in practice, research has been noticeably absent on the topic of
buyers who limit access to suppliers during the sales cycle. As such, we advance the
literature by introducing and examining the notion of barricaded buyers. In doing so, I
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complement research on “gatekeeping” by highlighting the incidence and importance of
impersonal, policy barricades. In addition, I begin to shed light on the underdeveloped area
of business-to-government (B2G) selling (see Lilien 2016) and, relatedly, on requests for
proposals (RFPs). Although academic examinations of B2G settings and RFPs are scarce
(see Johnson, Friend, and Malshe 2016), existing RFP research tends to ignore important
RFP content factors (e.g., novel and consummate solutions) and to focus on objective
factors, such as price and delivery terms (Crow et al. 1980; Vyas and Woodside 1984). The
present research, in contrast, points to the importance of subjective factors, such as how
content is delivered in the RFP responses (e.g., tone, explicitness, and tailoring). Making
positive impressions through these subjective factors is particularly important in barricaded
buyer settings because suppliers have limited opportunities to overcome negative
perceptions. Thus, the present research also moves the literature on RFPs beyond its
traditional focus on objective factors to one that also incorporates buyers’ subjective
evaluations.

Our research also highlights the importance of strategic information disclosure (i.e., the
thoughtfulness and timeliness with which a focal supplier provides information to buyers)
when selling to barricaded buyers. Prior research implicitly assumes that information
exchange between buyers and suppliers tends to be beneficial across all phases of the sales
cycle (MacDonald et al. 2016; Moriarty and Spekman 1984). However, the present
research suggests that it is important to know when to convey what types of information in
barricaded buying environments.
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For instance, the present research lends some nuance to when a supplier should
communicate different types of solution information to a prospective buyer (e.g., Tuli,
Kohli, and Bharadwaj 2007). I suggest that in the pre-RFP phase, supplier’s should identify
solutions that highlight their unique capabilities, while withholding novel and consummate
solutions that may not reflect their unique capabilities until the post-RFP phase. Thus, the
present research takes a first step in understanding how suppliers can use buyer barricades
to their advantage, which, until now, has remained largely unexamined.

In addition, to the best of my knowledge, I am the first to integrate elements of competitive
dynamics (e.g., competitor motivation and capability) from the firm level (e.g., Chen 1996;
Chen, Tsu, and Tsai 2007; Smith, Ferrier, Ndofor 2001) to the transaction level. Thus, I
advance extant views that tend to focus on interactions between one buyer (or buying firm)
and one seller (or selling firm) (e.g., Hall, Ahearne, and Sujan 2015; Homburg, Müller, and
Klarmann 2011; Mullins et al. 2014) to a view of selling that incorporates competitive
dynamics among multiple sellers vying for a buyer’s business. Doing so leads to the
introduction of new variables such as peacocking, which show how suppliers can
demotivate their competitors. As such, I provide evidence that examinations of salesperson
performance should consider including variables that incorporate a salesperson’s impact
on the competition (e.g., peacocking, instilling unique language) in addition to traditional
selling variables that directly affect customers (e.g., adaptive selling).
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3.5.2

Managerial Implications

The results of my research have implications for suppliers who sell to barricaded buyers.
Although suppliers could find it frustrating to be restricted from buyers in barricaded
settings, my research suggests they can use the barricade strategically to increase their
likelihood of selection. In particular, suppliers should be mindful about when to share what
information, and how to deliver it.

In the pre-RFP phase, competitors often have the ability to respond to a supplier’s
competitive actions. As such, suppliers should attempt to elicit customer needs they are
uniquely capable of addressing and offer solutions they are uniquely capable of providing.
In addition, suppliers should seek opportunities to inject their firm’s idiosyncratic
terminology into their discussions with buyers. Doing so develops a common language
with the buyer, which may result in its inclusion in the formal RFP. Suppliers should also
consider opportunities to “peacock” to their competitors by announcing their tight
connections and relationships to the buyer. Adopting these strategies can undermine the
ability and motivation of competitors to respond to the RFP, thereby enhancing a supplier’s
selection likelihood.

In the post-RFP phase, competitors are less capable of responding to a focal supplier’s RFP
response. Thus, suppliers have the opportunity to distinguish themselves by providing a
high quality RFP. The present research provides insight into what constitutes a high quality
RFP. First, suppliers should resist the urge to share a novel and consummate solutions prior
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to submitting them in their RFP response. Doing so can help prevent a competitor from
offering the same or better version of the solution to the buyer, thereby negating the
supplier’s opportunity to differentiate itself. Along these lines, suppliers need to resist the
urge to answer RFP questions in kind. Rather, the present research suggests that thinking
outside the box (i.e., novel solutions) and providing solutions and ideas that go beyond
what is expected (consummate solutions) provide positive signals to buyers.

Our research suggests that suppliers should also provide references that are similar to the
prospective buyer (e.g., in size, scope, and industry). Doing so signals they are more likely
to understand the customer’s needs and can offer the appropriate solutions. These signals
are important to buyers as they appear to take the place of information that buyers typically
gather during face-to-face interactions with suppliers.

Finally, my research suggests that buyers frequently rely on subjective factors in RFP
responses when eliminating suppliers from consideration. I were surprised by the lack of
attention to these factors by suppliers in my research, especially because buyers hinted they
may be as, or more, important than objective factors (such as price) when selling to them.
Thus, suppliers need to be conscientious about “soft” factors, such as the tone, explicitness,
and tailoring of their RFP responses.
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3.5.3

Limitations and Future Research Directions

As with most research, the present research has its limitations. The present research was
conducted within one large public organization. Although my findings reflect a diverse set
of purchases, future research should examine other organizations and types of purchases.
In addition, future research could provide additional insights by examining purchasing
practices across different government levels (e.g., local, county, state, and federal). Also,
although my focus was on barricaded buying in the public domain (Lilien 2016), future
research should examine barricaded buying in the private sector (e.g., pharmaceuticals and
financial services).

The present research reflects a policy-based and impersonal barricade that suppliers
frequently encounter in the government selling environment. As noted, however, there are
other types of barricades that suppliers may face, such as gatekeepers, which affect buyer
and supplier behaviors. As such, it would be beneficial to identify different types of
barricades and how they might interplay to affect the buying process. Such an endeavor
could provide valuable insights to sales managers and salespeople about the challenges
they face in different industry contexts.

Finally, like Tuli, Kohli, and Bharadwaj (2007), I do not integrate variables customarily
associated with sales performance such as trust, adaptive selling, or customer orientation
(Franke and Park 2006; Spiro and Weitz 1990) into my framework. Rather, my focus was
on variables that emerged from my research and on those that are less frequently discussed

88

in the literature. Future researchers, therefore, should integrate these important variables
into their studies to ensure the veracity of those proposed here.
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3.6

Tables and Figures
Table 3-1: Barricaded Buying Language in State and Federal Purchasing Policies

Municipality

Alabama

Post-RFP

Alaska

None
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Federal

Timing of
Barricade
Post-RFP

Policy Language

Source

*General information about agency mission needs and future
requirements may be disclosed at any time. After release of
the solicitation, the contracting officer must be the focal
point of any exchange with potential offerors. When
specific information about a proposed acquisition that would
be necessary for the preparation of proposals is disclosed to
one or more potential offerors, that information must be
made available to the public as soon as practicable, but no
later than the next general release of information, in order to
avoid creating an unfair competitive advantage.
From the issue date of this Solicitation until a Contractor is
selected and a contract award is made, Respondents are not
allowed to communicate about the subject of the RFP with
any [Organization Employees] except:
• The Purchasing Department representative, any University
Purchasing Officer representing the organization, or others
authorized in writing by the Purchasing Office and and
organization representatives during Respondent
presentations.
No mention

State
Procurement
Code Manual,
Section
15.200(f)

State RFP
Section 5.13
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Arizona

Pre and Post RFP

Arkansas

Post-RFP

California

Post-RFP

Colorado

Post-RFP

Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 38-503 through 38-505, 41-741,
41-753, 41-2503, and 41-2517 imposes certain restrictions on
communications between an agency and an offeror/bidder
during the procurement process. An offeror/bidder is
restricted from making contacts from the date of the earliest
notice of intent to solicit offers/bids through the date of the
final award, and, one year after award with the successful
contractors. The interval between these points is known as
the “restricted period.” Certain exceptions to this restriction
are set forth in the Arizona Procurement Code.
Prior to any contract award, address all communication
concerning this Bid Solicitation through OSP (Office of State
Procurement)
All questions must be submitted in writing to the individual
listed on the RFP.
The Purchasing Agent shall coordinate the offerors'
responses for review by the evaluation team. The Purchasing
Agent shall be the SOLE point of contact throughout the
process for all offerors.

Arizona
Procurement
Code Section 3.6

State RFP
Section 1.17 (A)
State RFP
Template
State RFP
#99439321
Section IV (A)

Post-RFP

Communication with Potential Bidders: All communications
with
potential bidders regarding the RFP or the RFQ shall be in
writing and shall be conducted through the Procurement
Services Department. Members of the selection committee
(see subsection 4 below) shall not have direct communication
with bidders relating in any manner to the RFP or the RFQ.
A pre-bid conference may be convened by the agency if
deemed to be in its best interest.

State
Procurement
Manual Section
K-4

Delaware

Post-RFP

State RFP
Section IV (4)

District of
Columbia
(DC)

Post-RFP

All requests, questions, or other communications about this
RFP shall be made in writing to the State of Delaware.
Address all communications to the person listed below;
communications made to other State of Delaware personnel
or attempting to ask questions by phone or in person will not
be allowed or recognized as valid and may disqualify the
vendor. Vendors should rely only on written statements
issued by the RFP designated contact.
Exchanges with offerors after receipt of proposals are
allowed. These may take the form of clarifications,
communications, or discussions. Exchanges shall take place
as part of the formal selection process and only with the
Authority representative who is specifically identified to
receive or transmit information.
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Connecticut

DC Water
Authority
Procurement
Manual Chapter
7.4.3.2

Post-RFP

Georgia

Post-RFP

Hawaii

Post-RFP

Idaho

Post-RFP

Illinois

Post-RFP*

Indiana

Post-RFP
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Florida

*Stage Four of the Public Procurement Process is the
Solicitation process. The purpose of this Stage is to publicly
release the competitive solicitation to the vendor
community and collect responses that are submitted by the
date and time listed in the solicitation Timeline of Events.
During stage four, the Procurement Officer will serve as the
sole point of contact for the solicitation.
From the issue date of the solicitation and until a supplier is
selected for contract award and the selection is made public,
suppliers are not allowed to communicate for any reason with
any state staff regarding the solicitation except through the
issuing officer (or his/her designee) named in the solicitation.
Prohibited communication includes all contact or interaction,
including but not limited to telephonic communications,
emails, faxes, letters, or personal meetings, such as lunch,
entertainment, or otherwise.
1.6 RFP Point-of-Contact
From the release date of this RFP until the selection of the
successful provider(s), any inquiries and requests shall be
directed to the sole point-of-contact identified below.
If an evaluator is contacted by a proposer or other interested
party, the evaluator may not discuss anything related to the
RFP, the process, or the proposal(s), and must direct the
individual to DOP.
The sole point of contact in this Commonwealth for this RFP
shall be the Issuing Officer [procurement officer].
Inquiries are not to be directed to any staff member of FSSA,
or any other participating agency. Such action may disqualify
Respondent from further consideration for a contract
resulting from this RFP.

State
Procurement
Manual, Section
4.1 Introduction to
the Solicitation
Process
State
Procurement
Manual, Section
4.4.2. Restrictions on
Communications

State RFP
Section 1.6

State
Procurement
Manual P. 29
State RFP
Template
State RFP
Section 1.7
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Iowa

Post-RFP

During the publication period, prospective respondents may
State
not contact the issuing PA in person or by phone. However,
Procurement
vendors may contact the PA via email. The PA posts all
Manual Pg. 24
responses to email inquiries on the Bid Opportunities website
such that all prospective vendors receive consistent
information and no vendor receives information not provided
to all vendors.

Kansas

Post-RFP

The Bid Event ID / RFP number, indicated in the header of
this page, as well as on the first page of this proposal, has
been assigned to this RFP and MUST be shown on all
correspondence or other documents associated with this RFP
and MUST be referred to in all verbal communications. All
inquiries, written or verbal, shall be directed only to the
procurement officer reflected on Page 1 of this proposal.
There shall be no communication with any other State
employee regarding this RFP except with designated state
participants in attendance ONLY DURING:
• Negotiations
• Contract Signing
• as otherwise specified in this RFP.
Violations of this provision by bidder or state agency
personnel may result in the rejection of the proposal.

State RFP
Section 1.1

Post-RFP

Louisiana

Post-RFP

Maine

Post-RFP

95

Kentucky

Communications with Vendors: In order to ensure fair and
equitable treatment of all vendors, communication regarding
a particular procurement shall cease at an appropriate date
prior to the issuance of a Solicitation. Questions regarding
the Solicitation, once issued, shall be submitted in
accordance with the directions in the Solicitation.
It may be advantageous to have a period of inquiry on a
solicitation prior to opening bids to answer bidder questions
and clarify specifications. If an inquiry is in order, include
language in the solicitation.
Example:
This solicitation includes a period of inquiry. No decisions or
actions shall be executed by any bidder as a result of any oral
discussions with any State employee, or State consultant.
Only those transactions which are in writing may be
considered as valid. Likewise, the State will only consider
communications from bidders that are signed and in writing.
From the time this RFP is issued until award notification is
made, all contact with the State regarding this RFP must be
made through the aforementioned RFP Coordinator. No
other person/ State employee is empowered to make binding
statements regarding this RFP. Violation of this provision
may lead to disqualification from the bidding process, at the
State’s discretion.

KY FAP 110-1000 #27

Louisiana
Procurement
Handbook
Section 11

State RFP Part I
Provision B (1)
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Maryland

Post-RFP

Massachusetts

Post-RFP

Michigan

Post-RFP

Minnesota

Post-RFP

Procurement Officer – The State representative for this
Contract who is, prior to the award of any Contract, the sole
point of contact in the State for purposes of this solicitation.
After Contract award, the Procurement Officer has
responsibilities as detailed in the Contract (Attachment A),
and is the only State representative who can authorize
changes to the Contract. The Department may change the
Procurement Officer at any time by written notice to the
Contractor.
Respondents are prohibited from communicating directly
with any employee of the [Organization] except as specified
in this RFP, and no other individual Commonwealth
employee or representative is authorized to provide any
information or respond to any questions or inquiries
concerning this RFP.
Once the solicitation is published, communication with
vendors regarding the content of the solicitation must be
limited. Strict State and vendor communication protocol is
essential to ensure a fair and competitive purchasing
environment. State and vendor communication protocol is as
follows: The Solicitation Manager is the individual
responsible for leading and facilitating all aspects of the
solicitation process through contract award, and will serve as
the point of contact for potential vendors during this period.
Once the solicitation is released, all communication with
vendors must be through only the Solicitation anager.
Other personnel are NOT authorized to discuss this request
for proposal with responders, before the proposal submission
deadline. Contact regarding this RFP with any personnel not
listed above could result in disqualification.

State RFP
Section 1.2

State RFP
Section 6.1 (f)

State
Procurement
Manual - Section
7.3

State RFP p. 4

Post-RFP

Communications with State
From the issue date of this RFP until a Vendor is selected
and the selection is announced, responding Vendors or their
representatives may not communicate, either orally or in
writing regarding this RFP with any statewide elected
official, state officer or employee, member of the legislature
or legislative employee except as noted herein. To ensure
equal treatment for each responding Vendor, all questions
regarding this RFP must be submitted in writing to the
State’s contact person for the selection process, and not later
than the last date for accepting responding Vendor questions
provided in this RFP.

State RFP
Section 13

Missouri

Post-RFP

Questions Regarding the RFP – Except as may be otherwise
stated herein, the offeror and the offeror’s agents (including
subcontractors, employees, consultants, or anyone else acting
on their behalf) must direct all of their questions or
comments regarding the RFP, the solicitation process, the
evaluation, etc., to the buyer of record [Procurement
Manager] indicated on the first page of this RFP.
Inappropriate contacts to other personnel are grounds for
suspension and/or exclusion from specific procurements.
Offerors and their agents who have questions regarding this
matter should contact the buyer.

State RFP
Section 3.1.4
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Mississippi

Post-RFP

Single Point of Contact. The purpose of naming one contact
State
person, usually the procurement officer who issues the RFP,
Procurement
is to:
Manual pg. 23
ü Ensure that all questions will be routed through one person;
ü Provide the same information to all offerors;
ü Eliminate confusion (“Well, someone else said I could do it
this way”);
ü Inform potential offerors that they may not contact
members of the evaluation committee or agency staff;
ü eMACS provides the procurement officer’s name and
contact information.

Nebraska

Post-RFP

Nevada

Post-RFP

From the date the RFP is issued until the Intent to Award is
issued communication from the Bidder is limited to the POC
listed above. After the Intent to Award is issued the Bidder
may communicate with individuals the State has designated
as responsible for negotiating the contract on behalf of the
State.
9.1.7 For purposes of addressing questions concerning this
RFP, the sole contact will be the Purchasing Division as
specified on Page 1 of this RFP. Upon issuance of this RFP,
other employees and representatives of the agencies
identified in the RFP will not answer questions or otherwise
discuss the contents of this RFP with any prospective
vendors or their representatives. Failure to observe this
restriction may result in disqualification of any subsequent
proposal per NAC 333.155(3). This restriction does not
preclude discussions between affected parties for the purpose
of conducting business unrelated to this procurement.
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Montana

State RFP
Section I (B)

State RFP
Section 9.1.7

Post-RFP

New Jersey

Post-RFP

New Mexico

Post-RFP

99

New
Hampshire

Any questions, clarifications, and/or requested changes shall
be submitted by an individual authorized to commit their
organization to the Terms and Conditions of this bid and
shall be received in writing at the Bureau of Purchase and
Property no later than 4:00 PM on the date listed in the
timeline below. Questions shall not be submitted to anyone
other than the Purchasing Agent or his/her representative.
Bidders that submit questions verbally or in writing to any
other State entity or State personnel shall be found in
violation of this part and may be found non-compliant.
From the moment a procurement process begins, with notice
of a solicitation, to the moment it ends, with the final
contract or award, vendors/contractors and their
representatives may contact the Port Authority with respect
to that procurement only via the Procurement Department
individual or individuals explicitly designated for that
purpose. Contact is limited to obtaining clarifications and not
for the purpose of influencing selection. The complete
contractor integrity provisions can be viewed on the Port
Authority website.
Any inquiries or requests regarding this procurement should
be submitted, in writing, to the Procurement Manager.
Offerors may contact ONLY the Procurement Manager
regarding this procurement. Other state employees or
Evaluation Committee members do not have the authority to
respond on behalf of the FMD.

State RFP pg. 2

NJ Port
Authority Guide
to Procurement
p. 9

State RFP
Section I-D (3)
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New York

Post-RFP

North
Carolina

Post-RFP

North Dakota

Post-RFP

*State Finance Law §§139-j and 139-k impose certain
restrictions on communications between an agency and an
offerer/bidder during the procurement process. An
offerer/bidder is restricted from making “contacts” (defined
in the law as communications intended to influence the
procurement) from the date of the earliest notice of intent to
solicit offers/bids through the
date of the final award, and, if applicable, approval of the
contract by the Office of the State Comptroller, to other than
designated staff (as identified by the agency). The interval
between these points is known as the “restricted period.”
Certain exceptions to this restriction are set
forth in State Finance Law §139-j (3) (a). An example of an
exception would be communication during contract
negotiations.
During the period of evaluation and prior to award, only the
information provided in the tabulation is public record.
Possession of offers, including any accompanying
information submitted with the offers, shall be limited to
persons in the agency who are responsible for processing and
evaluating the offers and accompanying information. Vendor
participation in the evaluation process shall not be permitted.
The procurement officer is the point of contact for this RFP.
All vendor communications regarding this RFP must be
directed to the procurement officer. Unauthorized contact
regarding the RFP with other State employees of the
purchasing agency may result in the vendor being
disqualified, and the vendor may also be suspended or
disbarred from the state bidders list.

State
Procurement
Manual - Section
III Guidelines
for Solicitations,
Section F

State
Procurement
Manual - Section
5.3

State RFP
Section 1.02

Post-RFP

During the evaluation phase, offerors may not initiate any
communication with the evaluation team.

Oklahoma

Post-RFP

Oregon

Post-RFP

Limited contact. The State Purchasing Director may limit
contact regarding a solicitation between suppliers and agency
personnel during the solicitation process. The limitation of
contact may be described in the solicitation. All
communication between suppliers and agency personnel
regarding a solicitation shall be documented and submitted to
DCS for inclusion in the bid file.
SINGLE POINT OF CONTACT (SPC)
State RFP
The SPC for this RFP is identified on the Cover Page, along
Section 1.3
with the SPC’s contact information. Proposer shall direct all
communications related to any provision of the RFP only to
the SPC, whether about the technical requirements of the
RFP, contractual requirements, the RFP process, or any other
provision.

Pennsylvania

Pre and Post RFP+

Rhode Island

Post-RFP
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Ohio

SOLICITATION CONTACT: The individual listed below
shall be the single point of contact for this solicitation.
Unless otherwise directed, Offerors should only
communicate with the Solicitation Contact. The
State/Agency/University shall not be held responsible for
information provided to any other person.
Questions concerning this solicitation must be e-mailed to
the Division of Purchases at [….@purchasing.ri.gov] no later
than the date and time indicated on page one of this
solicitation. No other contact with State parties is permitted.

State
Procurement
Manual - Section
5.3.4
Oklahoma
Central
Purchasing Rules
Chapter 15,
580:15-2-7C

State RFP
Template

State RFP
Section 6

Post-RFP

South Dakota

Post-RFP

Tennessee

Post-RFP
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South
Carolina

Prior to the issuance of an award or notification of intent to
award, whichever is earlier, state personnel involved in an
acquisition shall not engage in conduct that knowingly
furnishes source selection information to anyone other than
the responsible procurement officer, unless otherwise
authorized in writing by the responsible procurement officer.
Offeror's Contacts: Offerors and their agents (including
subcontractors, employees, consultants, or anyone else acting
on their behalf) must direct all of their questions or
comments regarding the RFP, the evaluation, etc. to the
buyer of record indicated on the first page of this RFP.
Offerors and their agents may not contact any state employee
other than the buyer of record regarding any of these matters
during the solicitation and evaluation process. Inappropriate
contacts are grounds for suspension and/or exclusion from
specific procurements. Offerors and their agents who have
questions regarding this matter should contact the buyer of
record.
Unauthorized contact about this RFP with employees,
officials, or consultants of the State of Tennessee except as
detailed below may result in disqualification from
consideration under this procurement process.

State Code
R445.2010(B)

South Dakota
RFP Process
Workgroup
Report Section
4.2

State RFP
Section 1.4.2

Post-RFP

All communication with potential respondents should be
made only through the Purchasing Department or other
designated staff. The program staff should not have contact
with potential respondents outside of pre-solicitation
conferences. Likewise, a respondent that contacts someone
other than authorized staff in regards to a solicitation maybe
disqualified. While the Purchasing Staff or other designated
staff may not be able to answer all of the technical questions
asked by potential respondents, they will ensure that the
information is provided to all potential respondents.
The conducting procurement unit shall ensure that each
member of an evaluation committee and each individual
participating in the evaluation committee process:
does not contact or communicate with a vendor concerning
the evaluation process or procurement outside the official
evaluation committee process

State Contract
Management
Guide, p. 71

Utah

Post-RFP

Vermont

Post-RFP

3.1 Single Point of Contact
All communications concerning this RFP are to be addressed
in writing to the State Contact listed on the front page of this
RFP. Actual or attempted contact with any other individual
from the State concerning this RFP is strictly prohibited and
may result in disqualification.

Vermont Sample
RFP Section 3.2

Virginia

Post-RFP

The evaluators should be instructed not to contact any of the
offerors. They must also be instructed not to reveal any
information or tentative conclusions on the relative merits of
proposals.

State
Procurement
Manual p. 159
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Texas

Utah State
Procurement
Code Section
63G-6a-410,
9.A.ii.c

Post-RFP

West Virginia

Post-RFP

Wisconsin

Post-RFP

Wyoming

NONE
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Washington

The RFP Coordinator is the sole point of contact in OSOS
for this procurement. All communication between the Bidder
and OSOS upon receipt of this RFP shall be with the RFP
Coordinator, Any other communication will be considered
unofficial and non-binding. Bidders are to rely only upon
written statements issued by the RFP Coordinator.
Communication directed to parties other than the RFP
Coordinator may result in disqualification of the Bidder.
He or she [Committee members] has not had or will not have
contact relating to the solicitation identified herein with any
participating vendors between the time of the bid opening
and the award recommendation without prior approval of the
Purchasing Division.
This Request for Proposal (RFP) is issued by the Wisconsin
Department of [ ] which is the sole point of contact for the
State of Wisconsin during the selection process. The person
responsible for managing the procurement process is [ ].
APPOINTMENTS WITH BUYERS AND AGENCIES
Although every effort will be made to accommodate
salesmen or representatives who arrive unannounced, it is
preferred that appointments be made in advance.
Buyers and agency personnel operate under substantial
workloads and prior appointments will help assure full
consideration be given to presentations or discussions.

State RFP
Section 2.1

West Virginia
Procurement
Handbook
Section 7.1.3
State RFP
Section 1.3

Wyoming
Vendor's Guide
p. 2

Table 3-2: Characteristics of Buying Center Cases

Buying
Project
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1 Pest Control
2 General
Office
Software
3 Waste
Management
4 Specialized
Software
5 Veterinary
Services
6 Network
Hardware
7 Transportatio
n Rental
Services
8 Commercial
Printing
Totals

Decisio
n
Makers

Product/
Service

Buyclass

Service

Rebuy

3

Product

New

5

Service

Rebuy

Product

Supplier
RFP
Response
s
1

Total
Interview
s

Average
Intervie
w Length

Total
Intervie
w Hours

Meeting
s
Observe
d
4

RFP
Duratio
n
(Months)
2

4

32

2.13

4

11

25

5.00

2

3

10

2

9

45

7.50

4

9

New

8

4

7

22

2.57

5

10

Service

Rebuy

6

2

6

20

1.67

2

2

Product

New

6

8

8

22

2.93

2

2

Service

New

6

2

0

0

.00

2

4

Service

Rebuy

5
49

6
29

1
46

20
23.25

.33
17.83

1
22

2
4.25

Table 3-3: List of Propositions

P1:
P2:
P3:
P4:
P5:
P6:
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P7:
P8:
P9:
P10:

A supplier can increase its selection likelihood by increasing buyer familiarity with its
unique language during the pre-RFP phase.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater focus on its unique
capabilities during the pre-RFP phase.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of relationship
peacocking during the pre-RFP phase.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of information
peacocking during the pre-RFP phase.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of novel solutions in
its RFP response.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of consummate
solutions in its RFP response.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater reference congruency in
its RFP response.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater use of positive tone in its
RFP response.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater explicitness in its RFP
response.
A supplier can increase its selection likelihood through greater tailoring of its RFP
response.

Table 3-4: Pre-RFP Conference Language in State and Federal Purchasing Policies

Pre-RFP Conference Language
14.207 Pre-bid conference.
A pre-bid conference may be used, generally in a complex
acquisition, as a means of briefing prospective bidders and
explaining complicated specifications and requirements to
them as early as possible after the invitation has been issued.

Source
Section 14.2-6 (FAC 200592)

Alabama

A Pre-Proposal Conference / On-site visit will be held at
[Organization], MARCH 1, 2018, at 1:30pm CST, to clarify
the Organizations’s expectations to Respondents and to visit
the site(s). All participants shall meet at GATE 1.
Respondents whom meet the qualifications of this RFP and
have intentions of submitting a full response shall participate
in the pre-proposal conference and site tour.
If your agency plans to have a pre-solicitation conference,
you should either tape record the proceedings for possible
preparation of a transcript or keep accurate written notes. If
your agency responds to substantive questions during the
conference, you must reaffirm those answers in writing via an
amendment after the conference and distribute the answers to
all potential offerors.
Prior to the due date for bids, an agency may require site
visits to ensure that bidders are aware of site conditions. The
agency may also hold a pre-bid conference to allow bidders to
ask questions and/or exchange information with agency staff.

State RFP #T054715
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Municipality
Federal

Alaska

Arizona

Alaska Procurement Manual
Section AAM 81.110

Arizona Procurement Manual
Section 5.2.5

Arkansas

California

Colorado
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Connecticut
Delaware

OSP will host a Pre-Proposal Conference session that is
mandatory for all Vendors submitting Proposals. Vendors are
encouraged to attend in person, however, a teleconference
option is also available. Vendors will have the opportunity to
gain further understanding of the RFP requirements, process
and procedures.
Prepare the Notice to Contractors, including the following
notifications include… Date, time, and place of a pre-bid
meeting and/or site inspection. Mandatory pre-bid meetings
shall not occur fewer than five (5) calendar days after the first
publication of the initial Notice to Bidders (PCC § 6610).
Pre-bid conferences may be conducted to explain the
procurement requirements. They shall be announced on
BIDS. The conference should be held long enough after the
Invitation for Bid has been issued, to allow bidders to become
familiar with it, but with adequate time before bid opening to
allow bidders consideration of the conference results in
preparing their bids. Nothing stated at the pre-bid conference
shall change the Invitation for Bids unless a change is made
by written amendment, posted on BIDS.
See barricaded language

Arkans RFP SP-17-0006
Section 2.1.2

Pre-bid conferences. — An agency may conduct a pre-bid
conference within a reasonable time but not less than 7 days
before a bid opening to explain the requirements of an
invitation to bid. An agency may require mandatory
attendance by bidders at such pre-bid conferences to qualify
as a responsible and responsive bidder. Statements made at
the pre-bid conference shall not be considered amendments to

State Procurement Code §
6923 (f)

Pg. 113-114

State Procurement Manual
Section R-24-103-202a-02

State Procurement Manual
Section K-4

the invitation to bid unless a written amendment is issued
pursuant to subsection (g) of this section.

District of Columbia (DC)
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Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Pre-proposal conferences are generally used in complex
acquisitions as a means of briefing prospective offerors and
explaining complicated specifications and requirements.
Although various aspects of the RFP and the requirements
may be discussed, a statement during the pre-proposal
conference by itself shall not change the RFP. All changes to
the RFP shall be issued through an amendment.
The Procurement Officer may host a Pre-Response
Conference that will serve as the first opportunity for
potential respondents to ask questions about the solicitation
Additional scheduled activities may include, but are not
limited to, receiving and answering suppliers’ questions or
conducting an offerors’ or pre-bid conference.
Generally; At least 15 days prior to the submission of bids
pursuant to §103D-302 for a construction or design-build
project with a total estimated contract value of $500,000 or
more, and at least 15 days prior to the submission of
proposals pursuant to §103D-303 for a construction or designbuild project with a total estimated contract value of $100,000
or more, the head of the purchasing agency shall hold a pre-b
id conference and shall invite all potential interested bidders,
offerors, subcontractors, and union representatives to attend.
HRS §103D-303.5.

DC Water Authority
Procurement Manual Chapter
7.3.3

Section 4.1, pg. 63

Section 3.5.2

State Procurement Manual
Section V.

Idaho

Illinois
Indiana
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Iowa

Kansas

The Pre-Bid or Pre-Proposal conference is conducted/led by
DOP (DOP will introduce the procurement, have attendees
introduce themselves, provide an overview of the solicitation
process and highlight the mandatory (M) requirements of the
solicitation).
e. Notifies BSBO, in writing, of the pre-proposal conference
date and offers BSBO the opportunity to participate.
Pre-RFP Informational Session
In order to ensure that State agencies are developing RFPs
that are reflective of the latest technology and processes and
that the agency has input from local industry representatives,
a pre-RFP informational session is required prior to the
planned issuance of any RFP. In some cases, IDOA may
determine a combined session of the pre-RFP informational
session and the pre-proposal conference may best suit the
process. This session is a great opportunity for Indiana
certified minority and women businesses to identify prime
bidders they may wish to partner with.
Pre-Proposal Conference/Site Visit
Some RFPs include a conference or site visit as specified in
the solicitation documents prior to the due date for proposals.
Occasionally, site visits are necessary or helpful to provide
respondents with additional information.
RFP will typically involve a Pre-Bid Question & Answer
Period or may include a Pre-Bid Conference if on-site
discussions/tour are needed,
• Allows potential vendors to request clarification of RFP
information
• Q&A released to all known interested vendors via
addendum, posted to the Internet

Chapter 8, pg. 22

Part II, Ch 07 - pg. 3
https://www.in.gov/idoa/3110
.htm

State Procurement Manual
Pg. 28

State Procurement Manual
Pg. 10

Kentucky

Louisiana

111

Maine

Maryland

3.8 Pre-Bid Conferences
A pre-bid conference may be conducted to explain the
procurement requirements for any particular procurement.
The conference shall be open to the public, and the date,
place and time of the conference shall be announced to all
prospective bidders known to have received the invitation for
bids, or a notice of availability of the invitation for bids.
There are two types of prebid conferences – mandatory and
non-mandatory. If the prebid conference is mandatory, only
the companies represented by attendees may be considered
for an award. A mandatory pre-bid conference must have
compelling reasons and should be avoided wherever possible
in an effort to increase competition. Note: State Purchasing
requires all mandatory pre-bid conferences other than those
substantiated by an architect’s letter on construction, to have
management approval prior to bidding.
Pre-Bidders conferences are allowed, but are not required.
These conferences are used to be certain that all bidders have
an equal understanding of the state requirements.
A Pre-Proposal Conference (the Conference) will be held at
the date, time, and location indicated in the RFP Key
Information Summary Sheet (near the beginning of the
solicitation, after the Title Page and Notice to Vendors).
All prospective Offerors are encouraged to attend in order to
facilitate better preparation of their Proposals.

Kentucky Model Procurement
Code 45A.360

Louisiana Procurement
Handbook Section 10

Chapter 110, Section II, A-IV

State RFP Section 1.7

Massachusetts

Michigan
112

Minnesota

You may hold a bidders’ or proposers’ conference to
supplement the purchase description. A pre-bid or preproposal conference may be necessary if, for example,
vendors must examine a particular piece of equipment or
inspect a facility that will be operated or managed under the
contract you are awarding. However, a sufficiently detailed
purchase description may make a conference unnecessary.
You may choose to make the conference optional or
mandatory. In either case, you should include notice of the
conference in the purchase description, record all comments,
questions, and answers at the conference, and distribute this
record to all vendors in time for them to prepare their
submittals.
Use pre-bid and pre-proposal conferences for complex
acquisitions, such as facility construction, or acquisitions that
will likely receive a single bid, such as recent MDOT
procurements for the MichiVan Program and intercity
services. Conferences can be used as a means of briefing
prospective offerors and explaining complicated
specifications and requirements to them as early as possible
after the solicitation has been issued and before offers are
received.
Pre-Bid Conference
If a pre-bid conference is indicated, you are encouraged to
attend as this is an open discussion of the bid documents. City
staff and any other involved parties are available to answer
any questions.

State Procurement Manual
Chapter 2 p. 16

Pg. 29

Minneapolis Procurement
Guide

Mississippi

Missouri
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Montana

Nebraska

Pre-bid conferences may be conducted to explain the
procurement requirements. They must be announced to all
prospective bidders known to have received an Invitation for
Bids. The conference should be held long enough after the
Invitation for Bids has been issued to allow bidders to become
familiar with it but sufficiently before bid opening to allow
bidders to make any adjustments based on clarifications made
during the conference.
Occasionally, the nature and complexity of a particular
solicitation will necessitate a conference with potential
bidders prior to the submission of bids to ensure the clarity of
the requirements. The specific date, time, and place of the
pre-bid conference will be announced in the solicitation
document.

State Procurement Manual
Section 3.106.07

If desired, the State may conduct a face-to-face or conference
call pre-proposal conference for potential offerors. This
conference may either be mandatory or optional for the
offerors to attend and must be stated as such in the RFP.
Mandatory conferences should be used only when absolutely
necessary.
A pre-bid conference is conducted to explain the procurement
requirements to potential bidders and allow potential bidders
to ask questions. Pre-Bid Conferences may be mandatory or
optional at the discretion of the agency. Responses to
questions during the Pre-Bid Conference are not binding on
the State unless answered in writing, and posted to the SPB
website.

State Procurement Manual
pg. 13

Missouri Procurement
Manual Section 24

Section 6.3, pg. 50

*Undefined in Procurement Manual but pre-bid conferences
are common according to Nevada purchasing website.

Nevada purchasing website
http://www.clarkcountynv.go
v/administrativeservices/purchasing/Pages/list
ings.aspx

New Hampshire

The RFP states a specific date and time deadline for proposal
receipt and often has mandatory pre-proposal meetings for
vendors to attend. This meeting offers the opportunity to ask
questions and gives the University a chance to determine
whether any changes need to be issued (addenda) to the RFP.
This is also an excellent time to conduct any requisite site
visits to familiarize vendors with the project site(s).

New Hampshire University
System Procurement
Procedures Section 06-007

New Jersey

§ Will there be a pre-bid conference? Where? When?
(State law does not permit mandatory attendance at a pre-bid
conference. The term “strongly encouraged” is advised.
Prepare, conduct /attend Pre-Proposal Conference

New Jersey Standard Bid
Document Section C-I

New York

Prior to the due date for bids, an agency may require site
visits to ensure that bidders are aware of site conditions.

Pg. 24

North Carolina

Conferences or site visits early in the solicitation cycle
provide an opportunity to emphasize and clarify critical
aspects of solicitations, eliminate ambiguities or
misunderstandings, and permit vendor input.

Section 2.1.C
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Nevada

New Mexico

State Procurement Manual p.
16

North Dakota

PRE-PROPOSAL CONFERENCES: Pre-proposal
conferences may be conducted in accordance with 1.4.1.18
NMAC of this rule. Any such conference should be held prior
to submission of initial proposals.

State Procurement Regulation
1.4.1.33

Ohio

Some bids include a pre-bid conference or site visit. Such
events will be specified in the ITB.

Section 5.2.1

Oklahoma

Pre-bid conference. The State Purchasing Director shall state
in a solicitation if the State Purchasing Director shall hold a
supplier pre-bid conference and shall state whether supplier
attendance is mandatory or non-mandatory.
Purpose. A Contracting Agency may hold pre-Offer
conferences with prospective Offerors prior to Closing, to
explain the Procurement requirements, obtain information, or
to conduct site inspections.
A pre-bid conference may be conducted to enhance
understanding of the procurement requirements. The pre-bid
conference shall be announced as a part of the Invitation for
Bids notice. The conference may be designated as "attendance
mandatory" or "attendance optional".

Oklahoma Central Purchasing
Rules Chapter 15, 580:15-4-5
(h)

Rhode Island

*Pre-bid conference is not defined in the procurement
manual, however pre-bid conferences are listed on the
purchasing department website

http://www.purchasing.ri.gov/
bidding/ExternalBidListing.as
px?Status=Active(Scheduled)

South Carolina

PRE-BID CONFERENCES AND SITE VISITS – SC Code
Ann Reg. 19-445.2042
6.4.1 Agencies must advertise pre-bid conferences and site
visits in SCBO.

State Procurement Manual

Oregon
115

Pennsylvania

OAR 137-047-0420

Title 44, Code 1, Subtitle A,
Section C

South Dakota

Tennessee

116

Texas
Utah

Vermont

6.4.2 The Agency should schedule the conference to occur no
less than 14 days prior to bid opening. This will allow the
Agency to clarify by addendum any issues bidders raise at the
pre-bid conference
Bidders
Conference
A meeting held with prospective bidders or offerors prior to
submission of bids or proposals, to review, discuss and clarify
technical considerations, specifications and standards
associated with a proposed procurement.
Pre-Bid/Proposal Conference/Question and Answer Period. If
appropriate, a prebid/proposal conference and/or a question
and answer period shall be included in the solicitation
process. The purpose of the pre-bid/proposal conference and
question and answer period is to provide prospective
bidders/proposers the opportunity to submit
questions/comments regarding the solicitation.
Agenciesmayconductmandatoryornon-mandatorypresolicitationconferences.
Mandatory pre-bid conferences and site visits may be held to
explain the procurement requirements in accordance with the
following…
Pre-Bid (Bidders’) Conferences and Adjustments to Bid
Documents
RFPs for large or complex projects shall require a pre-bid
meeting (conference). The purpose of the pre-bid meeting
(conference) is for the State to have an opportunity to review
the statement of work and other RFP documents with bidders
to ensure the State and the Vendors fully understand the
requirements of the RFP.

South Dakota Vendor Manual
p. 6

Tennessee Procurement
Manual Section 8.5.6

Page 69
Utah Code R33-6-101

Vermont Procurement
Bulletin 3.5 Section VII-B-26

Virginia

Washington

West Virginia
117

Wisconsin

Pre-bid or Preproposal Conference: Meeting held with
prospective bidders or offerors prior to submission of bids or
proposals, to review, discuss, and clarify technical
considerations, specifications, and standards relative to the
proposed procurement.
Pre-bid conferences and site visits provide an opportunity for
dialogue between the Purchasing Activity, its customers, and
the vendor community. Both facilitate the timely exchange of
information to enable the Purchasing Activity and vendors to
clarify solicitation requirements. In addition, any need for
changes in specifications or solicitation requirements may be
addressed to facilitate a more competitive environment, meet
industry standards, or better define state needs.
Pre-bid Conference - A meeting between vendors and agency
personnel which offers an opportunity to emphasize and
clarify critical aspects of a solicitation, eliminates
misunderstanding and permits vendor input. Vendor
attendance may be mandatory or voluntary as specified in the
bid document.
Conduct and document pre-bid conference, if approved for
use. In most instances, a pre-bid conference is not necessary.
For more complex procurements, the pre-bid conference may
provide an opportunity to discuss the solicitation
requirements, including explaining complicated
specifications, and to address any questions from potential
bidders. Such conference is held as early as possible after the
IFB has been issued and before bids are submitted and
opened. It must never be used as a substitute for amending a
defective or ambiguous specification or IFB.

Virginia Procurement Code p.
279

Section 4.3, pg. 22

West Virginia Procurement
Handbook p. 13

Wisconsin Invitation for Bid
Toolkit Section 6.2

Wyoming

Pre-bid conferences are held in cases where vendor or
manufacturer input is desired. Invitations to attend such a
conference are issued to prospective bidders.

Wyoming Vendor's Guide p.
2
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Figure 3-1: Conceptual Framework

Post-RFP Phase

Pre-RFP Phase
RFP Shaping
o Unique capabilities
o Unique language
Competitor Perception Shaping
o Information peacocking
o Relationship peacocking
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Supplier RFP Response
Content
o Novel solutions
o Consummate solutions
o Reference congruency
Delivery
o Tone
o Explicitness
o Tailoring

Competitive Intensity

RFP Response Quality

Selection Likelihood
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